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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CORPORATE 
SETTLEMENTS 
BRANDON L. GARRETT* 
Abstract: Corporate settlements are proliferating in form and function. They in-
clude consent decrees, corporate integrity agreements, deferred prosecution 
agreements, non-prosecution agreements, leniency agreements, and plea bar-
gains. Enforcers at the federal and state level enter an array of administrative, 
civil, and criminal resolutions of enforcement actions against companies. The 
reach of these settlements is global, and corporate fines have reached new rec-
ords, with penalties in the hundreds of billions of dollars affecting entire indus-
tries and economies. These settlements have not been studied together as a sub-
ject, perhaps because they span very different fields, from antitrust to banking, 
environmental law, health law, and securities regulation. Private settlements, reg-
ulatory settlements, and criminal prosecutions each bring with them different 
statutory and court-made procedures for approval in and out of court. Although 
judges have occasionally disagreed about the scope of that review, it is under-
stood that judicial review is needed to ensure that the public interest is met. Con-
gress has increasingly enacted statutes calling for public interest review of corpo-
rate settlements. Yet when government actors settle with corporations, courts too 
often presume the public interest and neglect statutory guidelines. In this Article, 
I explore how standards in disparate areas raise a common question: how should 
judges assess the public interest when corporations settle with the government? A 
common field of law, and perhaps more important, equity, governing judicial re-
view of these complex corporate settlements deserves study. In this Article, I ar-
gue that common equitable principles govern in the courts, but should be clari-
fied and developed further in judicial rulings, regulations, and statutes, using as 
their lodestar the equitable concept of the public interest. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate settlements with the federal government are proliferating in 
form and function. They include consent decrees, corporate integrity agree-
ments, deferred prosecution agreements (“DPA”), non-prosecution agreements 
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(“NPA”), leniency agreements, and plea bargains.1 Enforcers at the federal and 
state level now enter an array of administrative, civil, and criminal resolutions 
of actions against companies. They may be entered and negotiated in parallel, 
and settled jointly.2 The reach of corporate settlements is global, with major 
multinational companies involved, as well as coordination among nations and 
diplomatic efforts to resolve them.3 The penalties have reached new records, 
with annual total penalties in the tens of billions of dollars affecting entire in-
dustries and economies.4 These settlements have not been studied together as a 
subject, perhaps because they span very different fields, from antitrust to bank-
ing, from environmental law to health law, and from anti-money laundering to 
securities regulation. Private settlements, regulatory settlements, and prosecu-
tions each bring with them varying standards of judicial review and different 
statutory and judge-made procedures for their approval in and out of court. 
Generally, though, federal statutes and rules seek to ensure that judges examine 
whether the public interest is met. Yet, when government actors settle with 
corporations, often judges presume it is satisfied. In this Article, I explore how 
standards in disparate areas have converged raising a common question: who 
stands for the public interest when corporations settle with the government? 
The public interest has become far more salient as corporate settlements 
have attracted criticism from judges, legislators, public interest groups, and 
scholars. Criticisms include the lack of transparency in federal corporate set-
tlements,5 the lack of public involvement in the settlements,6 the lack of indi-
                                                                                                                           
 1 BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORA-
TIONS 13–15 (2014) [hereinafter GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL].  
 2 Id. at 137, 228, 252 (describing the prevalence of parallel civil and criminal litigation). Statutes 
have promoted such parallel litigation. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) 
(2012); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(d). See generally Richard M. Strassberg et 
al., Navigating Parallel Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 2006, at 9 (discussing courts’ general practice 
of allowing the government a stay of discovery only sparingly, even though parallel civil and criminal 
proceedings are underway). 
 3 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 
(2011) (discussing the “shift” in increased U.S. prosecutions of foreign companies) [hereinafter Gar-
rett: Globalized Corporate Prosecutions]. 
 4 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 5–6 (describing the explosion in the size of corpo-
rate criminal fines in federal court over the past decade); see PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST, BP 
AND ITS BRETHREN: IDENTIFYING THE LARGEST VIOLATORS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND 
SAFETY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 21–23 (2015) (detailing the rise in environmental, health and 
safety fines since 2010); Jill Treanor, Barclays, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland ‘at Risk of Further 
Penalties,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2015, 7:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
nov/17/barclays-hsbc-royal-bank-of-scotland-moodys-risk-further-penalties [https://perma.cc/3Y78-
MT25] (“Major banks have now set aside $219 [billion] . . . to pay fines and legal costs since the 
[2008] financial crisis.”). 
 5 E.g., Danielle Douglas, Senate Bill Targets Corporations That Deduct Settlement Payouts, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-
stop-corporations-from-deducting-settlements/2013/11/06/5fe1c180-4705-11e3-bf0c-cebf37c6f484_
story.html?utm_term=.7b9c3b241a9c [https://perma.cc/BHV8-D6XD] (describing proposed Government 
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vidual accountability,7 the lack of management accountability, the small size of 
the fines, and the effectiveness of the agreements.8 Answers to those concerns, 
I argue, lie in a common field of equity jurisprudence governing the judicial 
review of complex corporate settlements.9 As the Supreme Court has put it, in 
an oft-repeated formulation: “[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go 
much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public inter-
est than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.”10 
In this Article, I argue that common equitable principles should be developed 
further in the corporate settlement context through judicial rulings, regulations, 
and statutes—using the concept of public interest as their lodestar. 
Traditionally, federal courts have deferentially reviewed settlement 
agreements between parties, particularly when one party is a government en-
forcement authority.11 The settlement terms were often simple and largely con-
fined to payments of fines and penalties or agreements to cease violations. In a 
remarkable shift, across a range of civil and criminal contexts, the sheer scope 
of agreements has expanded. Settlements encompass staggering fines in the 
billions of dollars, and include complex victim restitution funds that must be 
administered over many years. Settlements elaborate the compliance to be per-
formed, and require that outside monitors implement and oversee quite intri-
cate institutional governance changes within these corporations.12 In doing so, 
                                                                                                                           
Settlement Transparency and Reform Act, noting that settlements “rarely spell out whether the entire 
monetary figure should be regarded as punitive” and, therefore, subject to taxes). 
 6 E.g., Complaint at 1–2, Better Mkts., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 83 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D.D.C. 
2015) (No. 14-190) (challenging $13 billion JPMorgan settlement as having been negotiated “entirely 
in secret behind closed doors”). 
 7 See e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prose-
cuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/JPC6-YH79] (discussing the lack of account-
ability mechanisms that impedes the government’s prosecution of major players behind the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis). 
 8 See, e.g., David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1410–11 (2014); 
Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Blasts “Too Big to Jail” Policy for Lawbreaking Banks 
(Dec. 13, 2012) (on file with author). 
 9 The American Law Institute is presently considering draft Principles of Compliance, Governance, 
and Risk Management for Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other Organizations. See Principles of the Law, 
Compliance, Enforcement, and Risk Management for Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other Organiza-
tions, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/compliance-enforcement-and-risk-management-
corporations-nonprofits-and-other-organizations/ [https://perma.cc/6MKG-TWXJ]. Those principles may 
include discussion of judicial review and structuring of corporate settlements. 
 10 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). 
 11 For description of traditional rules and case law in civil and criminal cases, see infra notes 46–
260 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 46–174 and accompanying text. On the rise in emphasis on compliance, see 
generally Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958–75 & 
nn.48–162 (2009) (providing background information on the origins of corporate compliance and 
related regulatory frameworks); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regu-
lation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing the benefits and risks of third-party 
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not only have private litigants, regulators, and prosecutors in disparate contexts 
borrowed corporate settlement tools from each other, but perhaps as a result, 
judges examine complex settlements that increasingly borrow terms, standards, 
and remedies across areas, ranging from criminal to regulatory to civil. To take 
one example, federal prosecutors began appointing corporate monitors in crim-
inal settlements in the early 2000s, and soon the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) began to do so in its civil settlements.13 Private plaintiffs 
set up large-scale victim compensation funds, and now prosecutors do so to 
distribute restitution or forfeiture related to criminal cases.14 Judges must reck-
on, in a range of areas, with the same functional problems of how best to hold 
a corporation accountable for violations and how to use their equitable pow-
ers—apart from the power to impose legal remedies such as damages—to su-
pervise implementation of complex enforcement agreements. 
Due to the increased prominence of administrative enforcement, the gen-
eral subject has attracted a wave of new scholarship, much of which has fo-
cused on executive power and oversight over agency enforcement, non-
enforcement, as well as the availability of Article III judicial review of en-
forcement and prosecutorial discretion.15 Article III judicial review, however, 
is not only informed by Article III norms and underlying statutes and regula-
tions, but also a body of principles concerning ongoing supervision of equita-
ble decrees. Article III invests federal judiciary with equitable power, extended 
                                                                                                                           
software used to assess and manage corporate risk); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecu-
tion, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (discussing the recent rise of “structural reform prosecution” against 
regulated firms) [hereinafter Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution]. 
 13 Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 89–90 & n.3 (2006). 
 14 See GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 122–39. 
 15 See, e.g., David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 
93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5, 10–43 (2014) (proposing a “three-layered conceptual framework” to guide the 
formation of “administrative agency enforcement and compliance” mechanisms); Kate Andrias, The 
President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1111–15 (2013) (arguing that the Presi-
dent should adopt a more transparent and coordinated administrative enforcement policy); Mila So-
honi, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. L. REV. 1569 
(2013) (arguing Article III review of private rights is more robust); Max Minzner, Why Agencies Pun-
ish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 860–61 (2012) (discussing rationales for administrative enforce-
ment); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in 
Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1016 (2001) (discussing the benefits and limitations of 
out-of-court settlements with respect to protecting the public interest). On deference to administrative 
agencies more broadly, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
315 (2000) (discussing the doctrine of nondelegation and its preservation of checks and balances on 
powers in the U.S government); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996) (describing the Chevron doctrine and its particular importance in adminis-
trative law, arguing for its usefulness in federal criminal law); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies 
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (argu-
ing that administrative bodies outside the judicial branch have a role to play in determining the consti-
tutionality of certain laws); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (1983) (same). 
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to federal judges since the Judiciary Act of 1789.16 Equity is particularly im-
portant in corporate settlements, where parties envision judicial supervision 
and detailed remedies over a period of time.17 The equitable discretion of Arti-
cle III judges in public law or institutional reform litigation brought by civil 
rights plaintiffs often seeking constitutional remedies is developed in an exten-
sive literature.18 How judges should supervise structural reforms within corpo-
rations or to review consent decrees or other forms of settlements outside of 
the civil rights context, however, is far less developed. 
In this Article, I explore the body of equitable law that applies to corpo-
rate settlements, and propose functional categories to be used by judges when 
deciding whether to approve, how to supervise, and how to adjudicate disputes 
that can arise over the implementation of corporate settlements.19 Judges have 
long applied these concepts in some contexts, but have only just begun to ap-
ply these principles in others.20 They may grow in their importance.21 The im-
plications may also extend to the questions of whether certain types of agency 
actions to settle cases are reviewable, and what the scope should be of that re-
view. 22 The burgeoning literature on agency non-enforcement is beyond the 
scope of this Article, however. 
High-profile controversies have erupted over judicial review of govern-
ment settlements with corporations, as these agreements have expanded in 
their ambition and their public significance.23 Fines and corporate prosecutions 
have exploded as have the detailed terms seeking to hold companies accounta-
ble, and federal administrative agencies can similarly claim record settlements 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and 
equity . . . .”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1–35, 1 Stat. 73, 73–93.  
 17 See infra notes 261–273 and accompanying text.  
 18 See, e.g., William Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judi-
cial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 641–49 (1982).  
 19 Several scholars have examined whether prosecutorial discretion itself is “inequitable” or un-
just; instead my focus is on equitable relief obtained in enforcement. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, 
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1660–
62 (2010); Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of 
Equity Into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 415–19 (2009); Dan-
iel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 757, 789–805 (1999). 
 20 See infra notes 260–272 and accompanying text. 
 21 I have recommended that such principles be applied in judicial review of criminal prosecution 
agreements in scholarly work, and as an amicus making recommendations to the court in a case in-
volving the question of what standard should be used when deciding whether to approve a DPA with a 
corporation. See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 19 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 22 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1001, 1007 (2012) (discussing “enforcement-litigation gaps” and positing that the kind of con-
stitutional issue at bar should affect how these gaps are addressed); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing 
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 666–69 (1985) (discussing “judi-
cial review of agency inaction” as a “necessary safeguard”). 
 23 See infra notes 46–260 and accompanying text. 
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and an increased focus on ongoing supervision of corporate violators.24 Federal 
judges seeking to protect the public interest in corporate settlements have been 
reversed in significant cases where appellate judges counselled greater defer-
ence to government enforcers.25 
Perhaps the best-known example among recent judicial rulings regarding 
such a corporate agreement was by Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff in SEC v. 
Citigroup Global Markets (Citigroup I), who found insufficient an SEC set-
tlement with Citigroup.26 Judge Rakoff focused on several defects, including 
lack of accountability of officers or employees, the small fine, and the lack of 
an admission of wrongdoing or employee accountability, noting that  
before a court may employ its injunctive and contempt powers in 
support of an administrative settlement, it is required, even after giv-
ing substantial deference to the views of the administrative agency, 
to be satisfied that it is not being used as a tool to enforce an agree-
ment that is unfair, unreasonable, inadequate, or in contravention of 
the public interest. 27  
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets (Citigroup II), re-
sponded with a reversal, disagreeing in part with that emphasis on the public 
interest, and holding: “[t]he primary focus of the inquiry . . . should be on en-
suring the consent decree is procedurally proper.”28 
That judicial interchange was no isolated occurrence. Similar rulings can 
be found across a spectrum of different types of civil and criminal enforcement 
agreements, as judges grapple with what degree of deference should apply to 
the initial approval and then the supervision of corporate settlements, that con-
tain not just terms regarding fines, but other reputational and governance relat-
ed terms.29 Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the Federal 
District of Columbia recently rejected a DPA with a company for foreign brib-
ery, “looking at the DPA in its totality,” and noting that not only were “no indi-
viduals . . . being prosecuted for their conduct at issue here” but also “a num-
ber of the employees who were directly involved in the transactions are being 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 46–260 and accompanying text. 
 25 Infra notes 130–139 and accompanying text.  
 26 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
rev’d and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 27 Id. 
 28 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup II), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014). For a 
discussion of the Citigroup II opinion, see generally Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed by History, 
but not by Reason,”: Judge Rakoff’s Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consent 
Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV. 51 (2012). 
 29 See Dorothy Shapiro, Lessons From SEC v. Citigroup: The Optimal Scope for Judicial Review 
of Agency Consent Decrees, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 63, 67 (2014) (describing “an overall trend, at least 
at the district court level, toward more judicial scrutiny over proposed settlements and agency consent 
decrees”). 
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allowed to remain with the company.”30 In a similar pattern, the D.C. Circuit, 
in its much anticipated ruling in United States v. Fokker Services, B.V. (Fokker 
III), reversed Judge Leon and strongly emphasized the discretion of the gov-
ernment to enter into DPAs.31 Similarly, Judge John Gleeson of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York, raising “public interest” con-
cerns with a criminal deferred prosecution with the Hong Kong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (“HSBC”) over money laundering-related violations as-
serted a supervisory power to oversee and receive monitors reports in the 
case.32 The judge’s separate decision in United States v. HSBC Bank USA 
(HSBC II) to make a redacted monitor report public was reversed on appeal by 
the Second Circuit.33 
Although each case involved a different civil or criminal setting, the con-
siderations that each judge invoked bear a close familial resemblance—they 
look to the “public interest.” That public interest is not synonymous with what 
the government decides to do in a case. Instead, judges inquire into whether a 
settlement in fact reflects the public interest. Equitable power is limited by a 
set of standards for the use of injunctive orders to bind litigants in the future.34 
The longstanding and traditional standards for injunctive relief include four 
factors, including the balance of the injuries suffered by each side and the pub-
lic interest.35 But what do those broad standards mean for corporations enter-
ing complex settlements, where the plaintiff is the federal or a state govern-
ment, which presumably has highly-informed views of what is in the public 
interest, as opposed to a private plaintiff bringing a civil suit? Settlements are 
unquestionably important tools for the government, to obtain favorable terms 
and avoid costly litigation with corporations.36 Yet, corporate agreements are 
complex and can affect many sets of parties, including the public. What does 
the “public interest” mean in the context of, for example, public companies or 
                                                                                                                           
 30 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker I), 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164, 166–67 (D.D.C. 
2015), vacated and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 31 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker III), 818 F.3d 733, 750–51 (D.C. Cir 2016). 
 32 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC I), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5–
6, 11 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), rev’d, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 33 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC IV), 863 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2017). This 
author wrote an amicus brief in that appeal. Id. at 137. 
 34 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (outlining “four-factor test” 
judges should apply before granting injunctive relief). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Enf’t Div., Testimony Before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services: Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. 
Financial Regulators (May 17, 2012) (on file with author). For the argument that judges should defer-
entially ratify such consent judgments, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in 
Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1014&context=uclf [https://perma.cc/N6Q3-B5G3]. For an economic argument 
that more searching review is sometimes justified, see generally Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review 
of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1999). 
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regulated industries, or where crimes were committed, with identifiable vic-
tims? And what if the settlement, despite having been negotiated by prosecu-
tors or regulators, appears to neglect the public interest in important respects? 
There is still more reason why the seemingly disparate categories of civil and 
criminal corporate settlements are converging over time. Some settlements 
involve parallel negotiation and settlement of actions by civil, criminal, and 
private litigants. Although a civil settlement may not involve punitive fines, the 
parallel criminal case may include those fines, and although the criminal case 
may not require ongoing supervision, the agreement with regulators may call 
for such oversight. Thus, judges must consider not only the settlement before 
them, but also the terms of related settlements that may be before different 
courts, or handled internally by a regulatory agency. 
In Part I of this Article, I summarize the areas, criminal and civil, in 
which Article III judges review corporate settlements and what law currently 
governs each type of settlement.37 In a range of disparate areas, as discussed, 
judges have developed tools for reviewing complex settlements. 
In Part II of this Article, I focus on how case law has developed responses 
to the following factors that raise issues common to organizational settlements: 
(1) reasonableness of any fines or other punitive measures; (2) adequacy of 
any compliance-related safeguards; (3) presence or use of independent corpo-
rate monitors to supervise compliance; (4) cooperation with authorities in any 
ongoing investigations; (5) the public interest as reflected in the substantive 
law giving rise to the settlement, including the presence or lack of require-
ments unrelated to the violation at issue; (6) potential collateral consequences 
of the agreement; (7) the interests of victims and third parties more generally, 
including participation interests and the appropriateness of compensation or 
restitution to any victims; (8) government interests, including those reflected in 
the substantive law, and the effect of the agreement on other enforcers or regu-
lators; (9) the effect of the period of delay on statutes of limitations or other 
interests; (10) the public interest in information concerning the underlying 
conduct.38 This is not an exclusive list of what might affect the public interest 
in an organizational settlement, but these are commonly raised factors. I ex-
plore how such considerations operate in the settings in which corporate set-
tlements are negotiated. I argue that deference is due to enforcers that must 
consider the public interest in the first instance. Less judicial deference, how-
ever, is due when settlements are reached in a relatively more informal manner, 
outside of procedural and substantive guides in legislation or regulations. Thus, 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See infra notes 43–260 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 261–335 and accompanying text. These factors were suggested by the author as 
amicus in the context of a DPA. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 
2015) (noting “the factors the amicus provided could be useful guideposts” as to the question whether 
an agreement “is truly about permitting a defendant to demonstrate reform”). 
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judicial consideration of the public interest is far more important for a DPA 
negotiated largely out of court, than if it was a plea agreement entered in court. 
The judicial review described involves consideration of the public inter-
est, an equitable inquiry. In Part III, I turn to proposals to improve the public 
interest review of corporate settlements, and not just through judicial review, 
but through internal regulatory measures.39 Congress has enacted legislation to 
accomplish this goal and more has been proposed; no doubt further legislation 
will be considered in the future.40 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has 
pushed for more consistency in its process for charging corporations, both civ-
illy and criminally.41 Those internal regulatory changes, however, have not left 
any consideration for the public interest. Indeed, internal guidelines have been 
adopted, but they lack notice as well as comment or participation by the public. 
Settlements reached using such mechanisms should receive less deferential 
judicial review than settlements reached using formal statutory or regulatory 
means. Despite statutes and judicial review designed to ensure public interest 
review and involvement of the public, high profile parties still enter into corpo-
rate settlements without meaningful participation of victims or public interest 
groups. In this Article, I conclude that no matter what the mechanism, one fea-
ture of judicial review under equitable power must remain central to efforts to 
improve corporate settlements: a careful consideration of the public interest.42 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS 
The public interest matters when prosecutors seek approval of settlements 
of both civil and criminal cases brought against corporations, but unevenly, 
depending on the posture of the settlement. Such agreements contain terms that 
can be resolved at the time of judgment, like the payment of a fine or compen-
sation to victims, but also terms that may require ongoing supervision, like 
implementation of a compliance program, or engaging in community service 
as a condition of probation. The question is: what standards of review apply to 
detailed agreements that call for such injunctive or equitable remedies and on-
going judicial oversight of corporations? Such a question implicates the equi-
table powers of a judge, and yet there is a tension between that power to su-
pervise an injunction issuing from the court and an agreement, in the nature of 
a contract between the litigants. Although the government may bring an en-
forcement action in the name of the public, the public is not a party. The public 
or interested groups, may seek to intervene, however, and even if they do not, 
equitable standards call on judges to inquire into the public interest or possible 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See infra notes 336–353 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 336–340 and accompanying text.  
 41 See infra notes 342–349 and accompanying text.  
 42 See infra notes 354–358 and accompanying text. 
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harms to the public or third parties.43 The role of the public interest in corpo-
rate settlements has long been disputed, and I describe how in criminal and in 
civil cases, judges have sought to engage in public interest analysis, but some-
times judges and appellate courts have tried to cabin that role and defer more 
broadly to government preferences and policies. That issue—what role public 
interest consideration should play—has been increasingly raised in the context 
of complex corporate settlements that pose more difficult issues for judges 
than standard criminal agreements. 
In both the criminal and civil context, judicial disputes have advanced our 
understanding of the equitable role of judges in such cases. This Part begins 
with an analysis of the role the public interest plays in criminal cases, focusing 
on disputes over the role of judges in DPAs, but also highlighting the 
longstanding role of the public interest when approving plea agreements with 
corporations.44 Second, this Part focuses on civil cases, in which consent de-
crees non-controversially require analysis of the public interest, but where dis-
putes have arisen regarding how closely the public interest should be scruti-
nized, and where legislation has attempted to strengthen judicial review of 
public interest considerations.45 
A. Corporate Prosecution Agreements 
In general, prosecutors enjoy enormous discretion in choosing where and 
how to bring criminal prosecutions, as they should. The Supreme Court has 
held, whether correct or not, that the discretion of prosecutors can only be con-
stitutionally challenged under “demanding” standards for showing invidious 
selective prosecution.46 Criminal cases, however, if settled in court, face cer-
tain prescribed judicial review.47 Plea bargains, as this Article later describes, 
must be approved by a judge, because they involve a final judgment of convic-
tion entered in court.48 Judges have long considered the public interest when 
deciding whether to approve and how to supervise plea bargains by corpora-
tions.49 A judge must also approve other agreements between prosecutors and 
corporations, particularly DPAs, in order to exempt them from the Speedy Tri-
al Act and rules that would normally apply in a case proceeding to judgment.50 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See infra notes 252–253 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 46–174 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 175–260 and accompanying text. 
 46 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996). 
 47 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1971) (requiring a sentencing judge to 
“develop, on the record, the factual basis for the plea”).  
 48 See id. 
 49 See infra notes 94–168 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.  
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In such settings, the role of the public interest is unsettled, but I argue in this 
Section that the same types of public interest considerations should apply. 
Criminal agreements between corporations and prosecutors have grown in 
complexity and their importance over the last two decades, particularly in fed-
eral courts, but also in state courts. I have detailed the use of various types of 
corporate prosecution agreements in a book entitled Too Big to Jail: How 
Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations, and in several prior law review 
articles.51 Those developments have made the role of judges all the more ur-
gent in corporate criminal settlements. The focus here is on the judicial and 
legal standards governing the formation of such agreements and the review and 
supervision of them. 
1. Plea Agreements 
Many criminal cases in the United States are today resolved through plea 
bargains and not a conviction after a trial.52 A judge must approve a plea 
agreement, but the role of a judge is distinct when the defendant is not an indi-
vidual, but rather an organization. Now, judicial review of plea agreements is 
highly deferential in general, and the same is true if the plea agreement is with 
a corporation. Judges have emphasized that they do not have a duty to approve 
a plea agreement entered between the parties; as the U.S. Supreme Court em-
phasized in the 1971 case, Santobello v. New York, there is no absolute right to 
have a plea agreement accepted by the court and a court may exercise sound 
judicial discretion in considering whether to accept it or not.53 The provisions 
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) reflect that 
view, including procedures for advising the defendant and developing the fac-
tual basis and voluntariness of the plea on the record and standards for plea 
agreement approval, which provide the court with discretion whether to accept, 
reject, or defer a decision on a plea.54 Thus, “[t]he plea agreement procedure 
                                                                                                                           
 51 A number of my prior works also focus on the subject of corporate prosecutions. See Brandon 
L. Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 154–76 
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Garrett: Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 
supra note 3; Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917 (2008) [herein-
after Garrett: Corporate Confessions]; Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 12. 
 52 Criminal Cases, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases/
criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/32DS-CAAM ] (“More than 90 percent of defendants plead guilty 
rather than go to trial.”); see also Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea 
Bargaining, THE ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/
plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/ [https://perma.cc/88EA-J595]; Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Criminal Trials Have Become So Scarce That Federal Judge Had Only One in His 4 Years on the 
Bench, ABA J. (Aug. 11, 2016, 7:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/criminal_trials_
become_so_scarce_that_federal_judge_had_only_one_in_his_fou/ [https://perma.cc/8WY4-56V3]. 
 53 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; see also, e.g., In re Yielding, 599 F.2d 251, 252–53 (8th Cir. 
1979) (citing FRCP 11 as granting courts “the right to accept or reject . . . plea bargains”). 
 54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b), (c)(3)(A). 
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does not attempt to define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea 
agreement. Such a decision is left to the discretion of the individual trial 
judge.”55 
The public interest is an integral part of what a judge may consider when 
deciding whether to approve a plea agreement.56 Judges are more constrained 
when a prosecutor seeks to dismiss charges entirely under FRCP 48, which 
may be done with “leave of court,” but where courts have stated that dismissal 
is a central element of prosecutorial discretion.57 Judges are highly reluctant to 
substitute their view of the public interest for that of the prosecutor in the con-
text of a motion to dismiss criminal charges—to warrant such action, the pros-
ecutor’s dismissal must be in bad faith or “clearly contrary to manifest public 
interest.”58 Occasionally judges have done so, however, including in corporate 
cases. For example, in United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor 
Chemische Industrie, an antitrust case, the judge rejected a deal to drop charg-
es against an employee in exchange for the corporate employer’s guilty plea 
because it went against the public interest.59 The case was of “the greatest pub-
lic significance,” and the conspiracy involved an “essential lifesaving drug” 
and the “public weal.”60 
The role the public interest plays is stronger when a conviction is sought 
in the form of a plea bargain requiring judge approval.61 In a criminal trial, the 
public, through participation of lay jurors, conducts fact-finding and reaches a 
verdict. By entering a plea, the defendant waives the right to a jury trial and 
agrees to receive a conviction. However, the role of the public interest does not 
end due to that agreement between the parties. Federal judges have broad dis-
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. R. 11(e) Notes of Advisory Committee on 1974 Amendments; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 
(“A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.”). 
 56 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) Notes of Advisory Committee on 1974 Amendments; Santobello, 
404 U.S. at 262.  
 57 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29–30 & n.15, 34 (1977) (per 
curiam). Thus, the D.C. Circuit had held that a judge could not substitute their view of the public 
interest for that of the prosecutor in the context of a motion to dismiss. United States v. Ammidown, 
497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 58 United States v. Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 459, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 631 (5th Cir. 1981) (“As long as it is not apparent that the prosecutor was moti-
vated by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest, his motion must be granted.”); United 
States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he standard for review of refusal of plea bar-
gains should be closer to the standards for review of sentencing than for review of a dismissal which 
does not involve a plea bargain under Rule 48(a).”). 
 59 United States. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 75 F.R.D. 473, 
474–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 60 Nederlandsche, 75 F.R.D. at 474. 
 61 See United States v. Harris, 679 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that a judge may re-
ject a plea agreement that is “too lenient or otherwise not in the public interest”); Nancy J. King, 
Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 133–34 
(1999) (positing that negotiated plea agreements do not, inherently, conform with the public interest in 
all cases). 
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cretion to reject plea agreements.62 FRCP 11 does not define the discretion of a 
judge to accept or reject a plea bargain.63 Cases, however, have developed 
what considerations may apply, including whether the plea was knowing and 
voluntary, whether proper procedures were followed, whether any third party 
rights are implicated, whether the agreement is too lenient, and whether the 
“public interest” is affected.64 
It is not a common occurrence that a judge rejects a plea. As scholars 
have noted, “[r]ecitations of the need to consider the ‘public interest’ appear 
repeatedly and with maddeningly little explanation in cases considering the 
acceptance or rejection of negotiated settlements.”65 Judges have long pos-
sessed and exercised discretion, for example, to reject pleas that are overly le-
nient.66 Judges may generally reject plea agreements “when the district court 
believes that bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.”67 
Other factors that the court may consider include whether the anticipated sen-
tence would be appropriate.68 Judges also ask whether plea agreements harm 
the judge’s sentencing authority unduly, and judges have raised questions 
about whether waivers of rights to appeal or certain waivers of constitutional 
rights, like to effective assistance of counsel, implicate public interest con-
cerns.69 In other cases, judges ask whether a plea involves abuse of prosecuto-
rial authority or discretion, or might undermine public confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system.70 
The role of a judge in reviewing a plea agreement is deferential. The 
prosecutor represents the public interest in enforcing criminal laws, and judges 
may not second-guess the larger policies or priorities of the government or the 
decision to prosecute a particular defendant. As the Supreme Court has put it, a 
range of factors, such as “the Government’s enforcement priorities . . . are not 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that Supreme Court 
precedent firmly established that judges may reject pleas at their discretion); Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 
622 (holding a judge can exercise “reasoned exercise of discretion” to reject a plea agreement, so long 
as that exercise of discretion is not “arbitrary”). 
 63 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
 64 Harris, 679 F.3d at 1182 (stating that judge may reject plea agreement that is “too lenient or 
otherwise not in the public interest”); see King, supra note 61, at 134–35. 
 65 King, supra note 61, at 134. 
 66 See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 332–
34 (1987). 
 67 United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Mil-
ler, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 68 See, e.g., In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 711–12 (9th Cir. 2007) (court must make an “individual-
ized assessment” of the plea agreement); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(“A district court may properly reject a plea agreement based on the court’s belief that the defendant 
would receive too light of a sentence.”). 
 69 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 60–62 & n.3 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 70 Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public 
Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 572–73 (1996). 
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readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to under-
take.”71 There may be public interests in having public jury trials, for example, 
but judges understand that plea bargaining, by its very nature, forecloses a tri-
al.72 
The public interest considerations that apply when a judge is exercising 
discretion in the context of a corporate plea are quite distinct. Plea agreements 
involving organizations raise issues that individual plea agreements do not, 
such as enforcement priorities, third parties, regulators, ongoing supervision, 
and the separate Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.73 As a result, courts 
have conducted individualized assessments in corporate plea agreements in the 
past.74 In doing so, they have considered fairness, reasonableness, and the pub-
lic interest broadly, as well as a set of more specific factors that implicate those 
broad public interest concerns.75 Specific concerns include rights of victims, 
adequacy of compliance, accountability for individual violators, and other con-
siderations. 
In conducting individualized assessments, courts have been willing and 
able to articulate public interest concerns. For example, a federal court has re-
jected, as contrary to the “public interest,” a corporate plea agreement present-
ed in a binding form that the judge felt unduly restricted his ability to impose a 
sentence.76 Another corporate plea agreement was delayed while the court con-
sidered objections by victims, but it was eventually approved after changes 
were made as consistent with the public interest.77 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit approved a district court’s rejection of a plea agreement 
due to the fact that the corporation would have paid a fine but immunity would 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 72 For the broader argument that plea bargaining itself harms the public interest, see, for example, 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992) (“[P]lea bar-
gaining seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separa-
tion of the guilty from the innocent.”). 
 73 Infra notes 231, 275–281, 341–348 and accompanying text.  
 74 Infra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. 
 75 Infra notes 275–332 and accompanying text. 
 76 Jef Feeley & Janelle Lawrence, Orthofix Medicare Probe Settlement Rejected Again by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2012, 5:49 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com (select 
“Browse All Content”; then select “News Search” under the “News” tab; then search title “Orthofix 
Medicare Probe Settlement Rejected Again by Judge”). 
 77 Jef Feeley & Janelle Lawrence, Merck Unit’s Plea over Vioxx Investigation Accepted by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2012, 4:58 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com (on homep-
age, select “Browse All Content”; then select “News Search” under the “News” tab; then search title 
“Merck Unit's Plea over Vioxx Investigation Accepted by Judge”); see United States v. Merck Sharp 
& Dohme Corp., No. 1:11-cr-10384-PBS (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2011). 
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have been given to a culpable individual.78 Judges have offered that plea 
agreements may be revised, or the judge will reject it.79 
In reviewing corporate plea agreements, judges have asked about the rela-
tionship between the entity and its officers or employees.80 Judges have reject-
ed as contrary to the public interest corporate plea agreements that involved 
immunity or non-prosecution of the relevant corporate officers or employees.81 
As one district court put it, “[p]ublic confidence in the administration of justice 
will be eroded if it is perceived that . . . an individual who operates illegally 
through a corporation can escape prosecution altogether and retain the fruits of 
his ill-gotten gains by having the corporation ‘take the rap.’”82 
An additional public interest consideration for courts has been the pres-
ence of accountability in the form of probation supervision.83 In a case in 
which victims intervened and objected, a federal court rejected a proposed 
“binding” plea agreement, noting “the public’s interest in accountability,” and 
stating the parties could submit a new agreement with probation and compli-
ance requirements.84 One year later, the court accepted a revised plea agree-
ment, which, unlike the initial version, provided for three years of supervised 
probation.85 This type of judicial review has been strengthened by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s 2004 amendments stating that even a corporation 
with a compliance program “shall” receive a term of probation at sentencing 
“if such sentence is necessary to ensure that changes are made within the or-
ganization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.”86 
Judicial review of plea bargains is not completely unfettered but it is not 
purely deferential either. The judicial review of corporate plea agreements 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462; see also United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 851, 853–54 (D. 
Utah 1989).  
 79 United States v. Farabee, No. 2:07-cr-00160 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2007); Criminal Minutes—Plea 
Hearing, Farabee, No. 2:07-cr-00160; United States v. Buffalo Valley, No. 2:98-cr-0000 (D. Wyo. 
Jan. 8, 1998). 
 80 See Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. at 853–54 & n.2. 
 81 Id. at 853; Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462. 
 82 Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. at 853 & n.2. 
 83 See United States. v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 917, 921–22 (D. Minn. 2010).  
 84 Id.  
 85 Bloomberg News, Judge Accepts Guilty Plea by Guidant, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/business/14device.html [https://perma.cc/M5EN-M9BQ]; Associated 
Press, Judge Adds Probation to Guidant Plea Deal, CBS: MINN. (Jan. 12, 2011, 1:27 PM), 
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/01/12/guidant-to-appear-in-federal-court-for-sentencing-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/U598-2FYR]. 
 86 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1(a)(6) (Nov. 2004). The commen-
tary section adds that not only may special conditions of probation include the development of a com-
pliance program, but “[t]o assess the efficacy of a compliance and ethics program submitted by the 
organization, the court may employ appropriate experts who shall be afforded access to all material 
possessed by the organization that is necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed pro-
gram.” Id. § 8D1.4 cmt. 1. 
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flows both ways, and judicial review can also importantly protect the rights of 
criminal defendants.87 In corporate cases, courts may reject plea agreements 
that unduly limit the rights of a defendant.88 For example, courts have rejected 
agreements that would require waiver of appeal rights.89 Although judges may 
not second-guess enforcement priorities, judges have insisted upon meaningful 
supervision in the form of probation and they have raised questions when em-
ployees were not prosecuted.90 Additional questions can be raised regarding 
the severity of the sentence and other features of detailed corporate plea 
agreements, such as appellate waivers. The role of a judge to review a corpo-
rate plea agreement to assess whether it comports with the public interest is 
narrow and deferential, but important. 
2. Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
Over the past fifteen years, federal prosecutors have dramatically trans-
formed corporate prosecutions by relying, in some of the most substantial cas-
es, on a new mechanism: the DPA.91 A deferred prosecution is filed with the 
court and remains on the judge’s docket until the term of deferral is completed 
and the case is dismissed.92 An NPA is an agreement to not file a criminal case 
at all.93 Unlike a plea agreement, which results in a criminal conviction, de-
ferred and non-prosecution do not create any criminal record for the corporate 
defendant. The use of deferred and NPAs in organizational prosecutions has 
become quite common over the past decade, and not only in the low-level or 
misdemeanor cases that Congress had in mind when it permitted a judge to 
defer a prosecution under the Speedy Trial Act, but also in some of the largest-
scale corporate prosecutions ever seen in this country.94 There have now been 
over 300 deferred or non-prosecution agreements with corporate organiza-
tions.95 Over two-thirds were with public companies, one-fifth were Fortune 
500, and one-fifth were Global 500 firms.96 Some of the well-known compa-
nies that have entered such agreements include: AIG, America Online, Bar-
                                                                                                                           
 87 See, e.g., United States v. Forest Pharm., Inc., No. 1:10-cr-10294 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2010); 
United States v. Biovail Pharm., Inc., No. 1:08-cr-10124-NG (D. Mass. May 19, 2008).  
 88 Forest Pharm., No. 1:10-cr-10294; Biovail Pharm., No. 1:08-cr-10124-NG. 
 89 Forest Pharm., No. 1:10-cr-10294; Biovail Pharm., No. 1:08-cr-10124-NG. 
 90 See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), rev’d and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014); Guidant, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 921–22.  
 91 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 45–80. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 7; see Corporate Prosecution Registry: Data & Documents, U. VA. SCH. L. LIBR., http://
lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html [https://perma.cc/
BPG3-2ALT] (last updated Oct. 10, 2017). 
 96 GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 45–80.  
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clays, Boeing, Bristol-Myers Squibb, CVS Pharmacy, General Electric, Glax-
oSmithKline, HealthSouth, JPMorgan, Johnson & Johnson, Merrill Lynch & 
Co., Monsanto, and Sears.97 
The public interest is implicated by both the approval and supervision of 
DPAs by federal judges. Judges have only just begun to assert such a role; ear-
ly on, judges typically approved corporate DPAs without conducting any 
meaningful review.98 However, the applicable section of the Speedy Trial Act, 
Section 3161(h)(2), refers to tolling time for “[a]ny period of delay during 
which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to 
written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the 
purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”99 The 
requirement that a deferred prosecution proceed only upon “the approval of the 
court,” makes the discretion of the court clear.100 In agreeing to defer prosecu-
tion, a corporate defendant is agreeing to waive its Speedy Trial Act rights. A 
judge must ensure such a waiver is appropriately demanded and obtained. Fur-
ther, a judge must ensure that a case remaining on the docket is being properly 
handled—in light of the specific language of the Speedy Trial Act stating that 
the purpose is to allow the defendant “to demonstrate his good conduct.”101 
Thus, judicial approval and supervision is called for by the text of the Act. 
In my view, any doubt over the meaning of such provisions should be 
read in favor of judicial discretion. Other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act do 
not require court approval, while still others limit discretion, for example, by 
providing factors to be considered when deciding whether to grant a continu-
ance, or by supplying standards for whether a type of delay is reasonable.102 
The provisions of the Act were generally intended to “strengthen[] the supervi-
sion over persons released pending trial.”103 The Report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on the Speedy Trial Act briefly discussed how several U.S. Attor-
ney’s offices had been experimenting with diversion programs, noting a Con-
gressional desire to “encourage” that “current trend,” and concluding that the 
diversion provision “assures that the court will be involved in the decision to 
divert and that the procedure will not be used by prosecutors and defense 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. at 47–48.  
 98 See id.  
 99 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012). 
 100 Id.  
 101 See id.  
 102 See, e.g., id. § 3161(h)(1) (providing a series of eight situations in which periods of delay 
“shall be excluded,” for example, set out in subsections (A)–(H)). But see id. § 3161(h)(6) (permitting 
a “reasonable period of delay” when a defendant and codefendant are joined for trial, and the code-
fendant’s time has not run); id. § 3161(h)(7) (permitting a judge to decide whether the “best interest of 
the public and the defendant” support granting a continuance based on “the ends of justice”). 
 103 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7401. 
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counsel to avoid the speedy trial time limits.”104 Such text, describing the need 
for the court to be “involved in the decision to divert,” together with the ex-
plicit requirement that a judge approve a deferral, clarifies a judge’s authority 
to review and approve such an agreement.105 Thus, the initial discretion over 
whether to approve a DPA is necessarily combined with the substantive review 
of that agreement and is joined with ongoing supervision of such a case. 
Such agreements typically focus on not just criminal fines, forfeiture, res-
titution, or community service payments, but also on what I have termed 
“structural reforms” reminiscent of institutional reform in public law litiga-
tion.106 These provisions can include detailed compliance programs, such as 
the hiring of additional compliance personnel, governance changes, and re-
quirements of periodic reporting and evaluation of compliance. Some agree-
ments require the retention of independent corporate monitors. Some agree-
ments (very few) call for the court to select or approve the independent moni-
tors. Still additional consequences include parallel settlements and terms re-
quiring compliance with civil regulators, or settlements with private plaintiffs. 
Standard agreements require cooperation in investigations of individual em-
ployees; the agreements may impact those employees, including if the firm 
agrees to waive attorney client or work product privilege. These agreements 
typically last for just two to three years.107 The agreements may be negotiated 
with multiple parties, including prosecutors from multiple offices, a range of 
regulators, and attorneys representing victims;108 some involve foreign gov-
ernments and their prosecutors and regulators. The agreements may also impli-
cate the criminal procedure rights of individual criminal defendants.109 
Courts have routinely conducted individualized assessments of DPAs 
with corporations as part of their decision of whether to approve such agree-
ments.110 In doing so, courts have remained deferential, as with any settlement 
reached between parties at arms-length, but they have nevertheless considered 
the public interest, reasonableness, fairness, equity, and other factors, in decid-
ing whether to approve such an agreement. To be sure, corporate DPAs are a 
fairly recent phenomenon, and the vast bulk of these agreements have been 
approved, sometimes after hearings, but often without hearings or written deci-
sions. Yet some courts have issued written decisions explaining the standards 
applied, particularly in recent years as the practice has become more estab-
                                                                                                                           
 104 S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 36–37 (1974). 
 105 Id. at 37.  
 106 See Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 12.  
 107 For an overview, see GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 45–81. 
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 109 United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); United States. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 
2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 110 See, e.g., United States v. WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO, 2013 WL 501784 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 
8, 2013) (permitting deferral of prosecution in accordance with the DPA). 
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lished.111 Those courts have approved the agreements as drafted after conduct-
ing such review.112 As will be described, such standards are consistent with 
ensuring that an agreement serves to provide a meaningful opportunity for the 
defendant to assure the government of its good conduct. 
In reviewing DPAs, courts have considered if the agreement reflects the 
seriousness of the charge, but also take into account other parties and employ-
ees who may be affected by these actions. For example, after conducting two 
hearings, the Eastern District Court of North Carolina in 2013 in United States 
v. WakeMed found that “after weighing the seriousness of defendant’s offense 
against the potential harm to innocent parties that could result should this pros-
ecution go forward, the [c]ourt has determined that a deferred prosecution is 
appropriate in this matter.”113 The court examined the “equities,” and conduct-
ed what amounted to a fairness and reasonableness review.114 The court con-
cluded the government had demonstrated that “the conduct at issue was serious 
and in need of being addressed by criminal process,” but that the agreement 
provided for sufficient fines, cooperation, and monitoring.115 The court also 
considered the need to protect WakeMed’s patients, as well as “the protection 
of defendant’s employees and healthcare providers who are blameless but who 
would suffer severe consequences should defendant be convicted and debarred 
as a Medicare and Medicaid provider.”116 The court held that, because “[t]he 
parties having agreed to periodic review of the status of this matter by the 
[c]ourt, any reports made relating to defendant’s compliance with the agree-
ment shall be filed with the [c]ourt for its review.” 117 This court indicated that 
it was taking many factors into consideration in its review of the corporate 
prosecution agreement.  
Courts have also noted in their review of DPAs that the agreements are 
opportunities to hold corporations accountable for their actions during the de-
ferred period. Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the U.S. District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in approving a DPA with Credit Suisse, made the following 
finding: 
this [c]ourt hereby finds that the period of delay as set forth in Para-
graph 5 of the written Deferred Prosecution Agreement is for the 
purpose of allowing Defendant Credit Suisse AG to demonstrate its 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See WakeMed, No. 5:12-CR-398-BO, 2013 WL 501784, at *2.  
 112 See id. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at *1.  
 116 Id. at *2.  
 117 Id. 
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good conduct and implement its remedial measures. Accordingly, 
this [c]ourt approves the written Deferred Prosecution Agreement.118 
Judge John Gleeson, in the most detailed opinion that has addressed the subject 
to date, concluded that the judge’s role under section 3161(h)(2) is not simply 
to assure that the parties have not colluded to toll the speedy trial clock: “ap-
proving the exclusion of delay during the deferral of prosecution is not synon-
ymous with approving the deferral of prosecution itself.”119 Judge Gleeson 
noted that “the Speedy Trial Act is silent” as to the standard for deciding 
whether to approve a DPA.120 As described in the Government’s Supplemental 
Brief, Judge Gleeson emphasized, apart from the language of the Speedy Trial 
Act, the supervisory authority of the court as a basis for the court’s active in-
volvement.121 In doing so, Judge Gleeson proceeded to examine the terms of 
the HSBC agreement and, in the process, found the fines, compliance provi-
sions, and other terms to be appropriate.122 Yet, Judge Gleeson found one fea-
ture lacking: the court was not to be kept apprised of the agreement’s imple-
mentation.123 The judge, therefore, ordered the parties to file quarterly reports 
describing “all significant developments,” resolving any “doubts about wheth-
er a development is significant . . . in favor of inclusion.”124 
Most corporations that plead guilty are placed on probation; in contrast, a 
DPA avoids formal probation supervision. To provide for analogous accounta-
bility, as in the WakeMed and HSBC cases, perhaps, the judges asked that the 
parties provide monitoring and compliance reports to the court.125 Other feder-
al courts have been less fulsome in explaining their approvals: “[p]ursuant to 
Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 3161(h)(2) and (8), the ends of jus-
tice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public 
and [the company] in a speedy trial.”126 
                                                                                                                           
 118 United States v. Credit Suisse AG, No. 09–352, 2009 WL 4894467, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 
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 120 Id.  
 121 Id. at *3–4, 11. 
 122 Id. at *2–7.  
 123 Id. at *7, 10–11. 
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 125 Id.; see United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC II), No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 
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ed such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) 
(2012). In his ruling in HSBC I, Judge Gleeson specifically disagreed that this broad “ends-of-justice” 
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Federal District Judge Emmett Sullivan, the first to set out criteria for de-
ciding whether to accept or reject a DPA, has suggested that nine factors could 
provide “useful guideposts” when evaluating whether a DPA is truly “designed 
to secure a defendant’s reformation” or whether the terms are “so vague and 
minimal as to render them a sham.”127 That standard itself is limited and defer-
ential, but it touches on a range of factors that might accomplish the goal of 
“permitting a defendant to demonstrate reform” when that defendant is a cor-
poration. Those nine factors include: 
(1) reasonableness of any fines or other punitive measures; (2) com-
pliance-related safeguards; (3) independent corporate monitors to 
supervise compliance; (4) cooperation with authorities in ongoing 
investigations; (5) the lack of unrelated requirements that might re-
quire judicial intervention; (6) potential collateral consequences of 
the agreement; (7) the appropriateness of restitution to any victims; 
(8) the effect of the agreement on other regulators; and (9) the effect 
of the period of delay on statutes of limitations or other interests.128 
Reviewing the two DPAs before him, Judge Sullivan concluded that the agree-
ments satisfied the standard of review.129 I develop how courts can use such fac-
tors, which I believe are quite useful, in Part III of this Article. 
Without setting out such a framework, Federal Judge Richard Leon re-
jected a DPA with a company called Fokker Services, finding the fines and 
compliance measures weak, an unacceptable absence of any compliance moni-
tor or requirement that the defendant submit compliance reports, and further, 
no accompanying individual prosecutions of defendants.130 Judge Leon was 
the first judge to outright reject a DPA, by “looking at the DPA in its totality,” 
and noting that not only were “no individuals . . . being prosecuted for their 
conduct at issue here,” but also “a number of the employees who were directly 
involved in the transactions are being allowed to remain with the company.”131 
Do any factors deserve special weight, or is this standard a totality of the cir-
cumstances inquiry? 
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The D.C. Circuit, in its much anticipated 2016 ruling in Fokker III, re-
versed Judge Leon.132 The D.C. Circuit noted that the purpose of section 
3161(h)(2) was to “assure that the DPA in fact is geared to enabling the de-
fendant to demonstrate compliance with the law . . . .”133 That much is accu-
rate. I argue that the D.C. Circuit erred when it ruled that a judge may not re-
view in any detail the substance of the DPA.134 I argue that the judge must 
conduct substantive and procedural review of a DPA to answer the question of 
whether a DPA is in fact geared to enable a defendant to demonstrate compli-
ance and whether the defendant’s waiver of rights is voluntary and warranted. 
Further, as I develop, a judge must ask very different questions when asking 
whether a corporate defendant is being adequately required to demonstrate 
compliance. 
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the government’s decision to seek a DPA 
is like a dismissal under FRCP 48, rather than a decision governed by the text 
of the Speedy Trial Act in which the placement of a case on a judge’s docket 
for an extended period of time is subject to its “good conduct” and the approv-
al of a judge.135 The D.C. Circuit emphasized throughout that entering a DPA 
is like a decision to dismiss charges entirely, citing to inapposite authority that 
the Executive Branch has “long-settled primacy over charging” and that a 
judge may not second-guess “charging decisions.”136 No charging decision was 
in question, however, but rather the content of an agreement to defer prosecu-
tion.137 The Speedy Trial Act quite specifically treats entering a DPA different-
ly than a charging or dismissal decision, because it is a settlement waiving 
rights and entered in court—one that implicates the judge in many of the same 
ways as a plea bargain.138 In contrast, a judge would have no role or reason to 
object if a prosecutor decided to dismiss charges entirely under Rule 48. The 
defendant is not waiving rights if charges are dismissed entirely. 
The D.C. Circuit has generally treated the judiciary as not “competent to 
undertake” an inquiry into the substance of a DPA.139 Yet, as discussed in the 
                                                                                                                           
 132 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. (Fokker III), 818 F.3d 733, 750–51 (D.C. Cir 2016).  
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prior section, judges conduct the very same inquiry when deciding whether to 
approve plea agreements with corporations.140 A DPA is far more like a plea 
agreement than a bare decision whether or not to pursue charges under FRCP 
48. As one scholar has described, “[l]ike plea agreements, DPAs include sanc-
tioning or punishing language, which a charging document would not contain,” 
and “because courts have the authority to review plea agreements, they should 
likewise have the authority to review DPAs.”141 
The D.C. Circuit erred in its assessment of DPAs in their relation to vic-
tims’ compensation. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), as amended 
after the Fokker case was litigated, makes clear that in a DPA a judge must as-
sure any victims are notified and proper restitution is provided.142 The Fokker 
III court did not address such situations that implicate the public interest or the 
rights of victims in its opinion.143 Nevertheless, the CVRA makes clear Con-
gressional intent that judges carefully review proposed DPAs, inform victims, 
and ensure that the terms of the agreement adequately compensate victims.144 
The D.C. Circuit’s suggestion that judges lack authority to review the sub-
stance of DPAs in any depth was legally incorrect. As will be discussed in the 
next section, the D.C. Circuit was also wrong to suggest there is any separation 
of powers or constitutional reason to interpret the Speedy Trial Act in a manner 
to maximize prosecutorial discretion. Review of consent decrees in a range of 
contexts requires judges to assess the “public interest” when deciding to grant 
them; it is part of the federal judge’s role and it does not raise any constitution-
al concerns. 
One limitation of judicial review of DPAs with corporations is quite clear: 
not all subjects permit judicial scrutiny. A court would be particularly deferen-
tial in reviewing the decision whether to offer pre-trial diversion to a defend-
ant. The D.C. Circuit opinion permits very little review of that decision. That 
ruling jibes with rulings in which courts have long held that a defendant cannot 
claim any right to obtain a deferred prosecution settlement, as all judges who 
have considered the question have quite emphatically stated.145As described, 
however, the terms of the agreement itself may raise a range of fairness and 
reasonableness-related concerns. Judges should, as Judge Sullivan did in Saena 
Tech, strongly defer to the choices made when negotiating such complex 
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agreements, absent unusual evidence that the agreement is a “sham.”146 Judge 
Leon concluded that the agreement before his court was an utter failure and not 
in good faith without applying Chevron deference, instead, applying his own, 
later rejected, “totality” test.147 
The Second Circuit’s 2017 ruling in United States v. HSBC Bank USA 
(HSBC IV)—in which an HSBC mortgage customer from Pennsylvania asked 
the district judge to order disclosure of the 1,000-page report by the corporate 
monitor appointed pursuant to the DPA—reversed the district judge’s decision 
to disclose the document in redacted form as a public document.148 In HSBC I, 
a prosecution of the bank for billions of dollars’ worth of money-laundering 
and sanctions related violations that resulted in “the largest penalty in any 
[Bank Secrecy Act] prosecution to date,”149 the bank received a DPA. The 
agreement received high-profile criticism, including on Capitol Hill.150 In ap-
proving the agreement, Federal District Judge John Gleeson noted this “heavy 
public criticism,” but approved it, while ordering the five-year corporate moni-
tor supply summaries of the ongoing implementation of a new compliance 
program to the court.151 The reports were not positive: the monitor apparently 
reported “significant concerns about the pace of . . . progress” in compliance 
and new possible violations, as has the company.152  
In response to the request by a member of the public, Judge Gleeson de-
cided to release the 2016 monitors report, in a redacted form.153 HSBC, joined 
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by the government, then appealed the ruling. I view such reports as of enor-
mous public interest, and should note that I argued in an amicus brief that for 
that reason and based on the Speedy Trial Act itself, the district judge acted 
well within his discretion to order that the monitor’s report be made public.154 I 
maintained that “there is a public interest in knowing if the monitorship is ac-
complishing the ends of justice contemplated by the DPA” and described how 
the Speedy Trial Act supports judicial review and supervision of the implemen-
tation of DPAs, as does standard practice in a range of civil and criminal set-
tings.155 
The Second Circuit did address many of those arguments, and the panel 
largely rejected them. Indeed, the panel included language that went beyond 
the circumstances concerning disclosure of a corporate monitor’s report and 
stated that judges have “no freestanding supervisory power” to review and ap-
prove such agreements or ensure compliance with them.156 Judge Gleeson, in 
approving the DPA, emphasized the “heavy public criticism” of the deal’s leni-
ent treatment of the bank, which avoided a conviction, and its employees, none 
of whom were prosecuted. 157 In ordering that the monitor’s reports be dis-
closed, the judge said it was “appropriate and desirable for the public to be 
interested and informed now in the progress of the arrangement between DOJ 
and HSBC that the government chose to make the centerpiece of a federal 
criminal case . . . .”158 That reasoning—in part depending on a First Amend-
ment question whether the monitor’s report was a judicial document—and that 
constitutional question are not ones I address here. 159  
In response, the Second Circuit panel never squarely addressed the ques-
tion of the public interest. Like the D.C. Circuit, the Second Circuit relied upon 
inapposite cases concerning a prosecutor’s charging discretion, and used the 
same troubling reasoning that statutes like the Speedy Trial Act should be in-
terpreted to maximize prosecutorial discretion.160 The panel interpreted the 
discretion that the Speedy Trial Act conveys as a bar on a judge evaluating the 
merits of a DPA before approving it.161 The panel, however, did note that the 
monitor’s report might become a judicial document subject to public disclosure 
if disputes later made the document relevant to judicial decision making. The 
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panel also noted that if any misconduct came to the court’s attention, its super-
visory power would justify monitoring the implementation of the agreement.162 
The Second Circuit should have also looked more carefully at the purpos-
es of and authority for judicial supervision of criminal matters. That panel sug-
gested that authority to review the merits of a DPA would go so far as to “re-
jigger the historical allocation of authority between the courts and the Execu-
tive.” 163 The panel cited no historical support for the proposition that federal 
judges must approve agreements without reviewing their substance, however. 
The panel did not acknowledge the large body of evidence concerning the rou-
tine and standard disclosure of monitor reports in a wide range of prosecution 
settings; it is not as if shrouding a monitorship in secrecy is somehow an im-
portant part of the prosecutorial role (indeed the monitor is defined as inde-
pendent of the prosecution and the corporate defendant).164 Moreover, the 
Speedy Trial Act, like the provisions of FRCP 11, including the procedures for 
advising the defendant and developing the factual basis and voluntariness of 
the plea on the record set out in FRCP 11(b), each call for substantive review.165 
In the case of a plea and in the case of a DPA, judges have a common need to 
inquire into a series of subjects. For example, defendants must be informed of 
the consequences of waiving their Speedy Trial Act rights, just as they must be 
informed of the significance of a waiver of rights when pleading guilty.  
Additionally, case law and standards for plea agreement approval can in-
form the standard for the approval of DPAs, where under FRCP 11, the court 
has discretion whether to accept or reject the plea, or defer a decision.166 The 
factors cited by Judge Sullivan, for example, mirror (and were in part drawn 
from) the factors that have arisen in cases in which judges have considered 
corporate plea agreements.167 As one student argues—and I agree—“the fact 
that judicial review of plea agreements is not unfettered does not mean that no 
such review exists: courts can review plea agreements and DPAs without pass-
ing judgment on the charging decisions themselves.”168 
To be sure, judges could be more explicitly empowered to conduct sub-
stantive review of corporate agreements by statute, to ensure that prosecutors 
do pursue the public interest when they settle with corporations. Concurring 
separately in the Second Circuit ruling in HSBC IV, Judge Rosemary Pooler 
wrote that, as I have described, the relevant provisions of the Speedy Trial Act 
were clearly written with individual diversion in mind and not large corpora-
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tions, and called upon Congress to enact legislation along the lines of legisla-
tion introduced to formalize judicial review over DPAs.169 In my view, the 
Second Circuit was incorrect. There is nothing vague about the language of the 
Speedy Trial Act. The language of the current Speedy Trial Act already pro-
vides authority to substantively review such agreements, just as they would if 
it were a plea agreement.170 Case law can and should cement the standards for 
judicial review, and judges have begun to do so already. As will be described 
later, in a range of regulatory areas, the procedures developed by courts or set 
out in statutes are designed precisely to accomplish that goal: to introduce 
broader public interest consideration when important settlements are negotiat-
ed with companies, but to clearly define the relevant factors and standards. 
3. Non-Prosecution Agreements 
In some instances, government enforcers can avoid judicial review entire-
ly. They can decline to bring a case at all, but in doing so, they do not obtain a 
remedy. As an alternative, government enforcers can rely on NPAs with an or-
ganization. A non-prosecution is not filed with a judge and, therefore, cannot 
be reviewed by a judge; such an agreement states that prosecutors will not file 
if the corporation complies with its terms.171 Antitrust immunity agreements 
also fall into this category. Although distinct from a declination, such an 
agreement cannot implicate supervisory authority of a court because nothing is 
filed in court and the court is not asked to approve it.172 Perhaps a company 
could sue to enforce an NPA as a contract if they argued that prosecutors failed 
to uphold their end of the bargain. For instance, in an antitrust case in the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court ultimately held that a company could bring 
a due process challenge to a prosecutor’s declaration that the company was in 
breach of its settlement.173 The Third Circuit held also, however, that the judge 
had no power to enjoin, before the indictment, the criminal charges that prose-
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cutors were bringing in response to the alleged breach. 174 These NPAs, there-
fore, enable corporate settlements to escape judicial review entirely.  
B. Civil Regulatory Agreements 
Corporate settlements also often involve agreements with federal admin-
istrative agencies outside of criminal prosecutions. A wide range of federal 
administrative agencies settle the vast majority of their enforcement actions 
using civil consent decrees.175 Indeed, in some contexts, like under certain en-
vironmental statutes, cases must be settled using consent decrees, as opposed 
to out-of-court settlements.176 Consent decrees are settlement agreements, 
much like contracts, but they are approved by a court, so that they involve ju-
dicial review. The agency can secure fines and impose conditions on an organ-
ization, and the text of the agreement can also set a template for conduct by 
other members of industry.177 
Although consent decrees may accomplish regulatory objectives, admin-
istrative agencies must permit public notice and participation rights when en-
gaging in regulation or issuing orders. The rules are less clear, however, when 
these administrative agencies engage in enforcement. The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (“APA”) protects interests of affected members of the public when 
agencies engage in rulemaking, including the requirement that notice and an 
opportunity to comment be afforded, as well as other procedures.178 The pur-
pose of these rules is to permit public participation, as well as provide infor-
mation access and an opportunity for deliberation.179 The APA provides for 
judicial review of agency decision-making, using a range of standards of re-
view.180 Other statutes supplement that judicial review, such as the Hobbs Ju-
dicial Review Act, which grants a right to intervene in actions before federal 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. For a discussion of the case, see Garrett: Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 12, at 
929–30. 
 175 Kristi Smith, Who’s Suing Whom: A Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit Environ-
mental Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995–2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 
387 (2004); see SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 176 See generally Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and 
Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, http://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=uclf [https://perma.cc/8Y75-HDP9] (dis-
cussing how limiting “the range of commitments the government may offer” in settlements can restrict 
the full effect of consent decrees that have played a key role in environmental policy). 
 177 See infra notes 221–241 and accompanying text.  
 178 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012 & Supps. II 2014, IV 
2016). 
 179 TOM C. CLARKE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 962 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transfor-
mation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755–56 (1996). 
 180 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). Regarding the complexity of these standards of review, see, for exam-
ple, David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 530 (2011). 
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agencies, providing that “[c]ommunities, associations, corporations, firms, and 
individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may inter-
vene in any proceeding to review the order.”181 
If agencies fail to comport with the requisite notice and comment proce-
dural provisions, then the courts may invalidate their rulemaking.182 If they do 
comply, courts will employ deferential scrutiny to their legal interpretations, 
even if statutes are ambiguous, under the Chevron doctrine.183 Some scholars 
worry that the procedural requirements of the APA are unwieldy and give 
agencies incentives to act informally outside that process, such as by issuing 
interpretive rules or guidance that is not binding like a regulation.184 Another 
way agencies can act outside the rulemaking process is through enforcement 
actions, which can be used to ensure that non-compliant actors are held ac-
countable, but which can also set an informal precedent for accountability un-
der regulatory schemes. 
The same rules do not apply when agencies act through enforcement and 
not through rulemaking or orders. In general, enforcement discretion is not re-
viewable, and agencies have broad discretion regarding regulation-enforcement 
and regulatory targets.185 A decision not to enforce is not reviewable under the 
doctrine of Heckler v. Chaney.186 Nor are agency plans for conducting enforce-
ment or monitoring,187 or decisions on how to allocate enforcement funds.188 
When an agency does enter into civil settlements and seeks judicial ratifi-
cation of the settlement through a consent decree, judges have a responsibility 
to review that settlement, but often this role is undefined. In some areas, legis-
lation has defined that judicial rule, as with judicial review of agency rulemak-
ing, but the courts have been mixed in their interpretation of those provisions, 
as I develop in the sections that follow. 
                                                                                                                           
 181 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (2012). 
 182 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Am. Wa-
ter Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 183 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984); see, e.g., 
Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore 
Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (regarding the complexity of doctrines of judicial 
review of agencies); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 153 (2010). 
 184 JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 9–25 (1990). See 
generally Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of the Rulemaking Process, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65 (2015) 
(comparing scholars’ views on addressing agency compliance with statutory rulemaking procedure); 
Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 621 (1994) (discussing the role of judicial review in the “ossification” of rulemaking, 
and proposing ways to ameliorate the process). 
 185 Rachel Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1130 
(2016). 
 186 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985). 
 187 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 67 (2004). 
 188 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993). 
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1. Administrative Settlements 
Outside of prosecution of corporations in court, administrative agencies 
may pursue civil remedies against companies using internal administrative 
proceedings before administrative law judges.189 The SEC can, for example, 
pursue administrative settlements with corporations, and the Dodd-Frank Act 
provides the SEC with greater ability to do so.190 There are not strong guide-
lines regarding when a case must be brought internally versus in court, a topic 
that has resulted in a range of criticism and proposals for reforms.191 Judicial 
review of such settlements is normally not permitted or provided for in the 
agreements themselves. 
Now, when agencies conduct enforcement actions using internal adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings, and a final decision results, findings of fact 
receive “substantial evidence” deference,192 and the final decisions in such 
proceedings cannot be reversed on appeal unless they are “arbitrary, capri-
cious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”193 In general, for such discretionary deci-
sions, review is to be highly deferential and a court is not to “substitute its 
judgment” for that of the agency.194 Yet when administrative matters settle, 
there is no final judgment to appeal. The APA itself does not address such situ-
ations, and such settlements have been found not to constitute rulemaking, and 
therefore do not call for notice and comment to the public, absent some other 
statute.195 The D.C. Circuit, the only federal court of appeals to address this 
question, has concluded that such administrative settlements are tantamount to 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
3(a). The SEC can also order disgorgement of profits. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(e), 78u-2(e); Bennett 
Rawicki, The Dodd-Frank Act and SEC Enforcement—The Significant Expansions and Remaining 
Limitations on the SEC’s Enforcement Scope and Arsenal, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 35, 42 (2013). 
 190 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a), (e), 78u-2(e), 3(a); Rawicki, supra note 189. 
 191 See David Migoya, SEC Wants Federal Court of Appeals to Rethink Ruling That Questions 
Administrative Proceedings, DENVER POST (Mar. 14, 2017, 8:14 AM), http://www.denverpost.
com/2017/03/14/sec-denver-appeals-court-judges/ [https://perma.cc/68U9-K7RL] (“Critics have ar-
gued that the SEC conveniently pushes civil cases into its own administrative courts rather than feder-
al circuit courts in part to avoid judicial criticisms about how they prosecute cases, as well as to ensure 
favorable outcomes.”); Breon Peace et al., The Future of SEC Administrative Proceedings, LAW360 
(Jan. 4, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/876875/the-future-of-sec-administrative-
proceedings [https://perma.cc/Y3RS-G7ZN]; see also Bandimere v. United States SEC, 844 F.3d 
1168, 1176, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that SEC Administrative Law Judges are “inferior officers 
under the Appointments Clause,” and one such judge unconstitutionally presided over an administra-
tive proceeding). 
 192 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). 
 193 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 194 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983). 
 195 See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., 
dissenting) (“The commitment that occurs through a consent decree takes place, however, without 
recourse to the public notice requirements of notice and comment rulemaking.”); Rossi, supra note 15, 
at 1016.  
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decisions not to enforce at all, and are, therefore, presumptively unreviewa-
ble.196 Consistent with the general discussion in this Article, and the discussion 
of consent decrees in the next section, I instead view any settlement with en-
forcers as a decision to enforce quite unlike a declination, and therefore pre-
sumptively reviewable.197 The same deferential, but still meaningful, arbitrari-
ness review should occur for administrative settlements as final orders during 
administrative hearings. 
2. Regulatory Consent Decrees 
Agencies can instead pursue civil remedies in court, and when anticipat-
ing that compliance with the settlement will take some time, can enter a con-
sent decree in which the settlement is judicially-supervised over some period 
of time. Judicial review of consent decrees is well established, including the 
practice of judges examining the public interest. Courts have debated, howev-
er, what the precise scope of that judicial review entails. Supreme Court rul-
ings on such consent decrees describe the role of a court in reviewing a con-
sent decree between a corporation and enforcement officers, as well as be-
tween private and public parties generally.198 A consent decree is a hybrid, 
where it is not a purely private settlement, but also has aspects of a judicial 
injunction implicating the equitable power of the court.199 There are certain 
similarities with the inquiry in which a court decides whether or not to approve 
a civil consent decree based on whether it is fair, reasonable, and consistent 
with the purposes of the laws or regulations, and if injunctive relief is part of 
the relief, whether the “public interest would not be disserved.”200 Review of 
consent decrees is necessarily highly deferential, but a court must consider the 
public interest and the sources of underlying law.201 
Courts have recognized their role in substantively reviewing consent 
agreements before they approve them. As one court has put it, “when the dis-
trict judge is presented with a proposed consent judgment, he is not merely a 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 197 For an excellent Note developing this argument in detail, see generally Dustin Plotnick, Agen-
cy Settlement Reviewability, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367 (2013). 
 198 See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 233–35 & n.8 (1975); United 
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681–83 (1971). These descriptions have also appeared in em-
ployment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 
566–70 (1984) (holding a district court’s modification to a consent decree in an employment race-
discrimination case could not be imposed upon the City of Memphis without its consent). 
 199 See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986). 
 200 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 
525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to 
be approved.”). 
 201 See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (“[A] federal consent de-
cree must . . . further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.”).  
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‘rubber stamp.’”202 The Ninth Circuit held that “[u]nless a consent decree is 
unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.”203 The D.C. Cir-
cuit explains: “prior to approving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of 
the settlement’s ‘overall fairness to beneficiaries and consistency with the pub-
lic interest.’”204 Thus, as the Sixth Circuit has put it, “[f]airness should be 
evaluated from the standpoint of signatories and nonparties to the decree.”205 
One court has tried to articulate the bounds of judicial review of a consent 
decree that goes beyond this “rubber stamp approval.”206 The Second Circuit 
recently emphasized in Citigroup II: “[t]he primary focus of the inquiry . . . 
should be on ensuring the consent decree is procedurally proper.”207 In fact, 
courts have long emphasized that review of a consent decree should examine 
the procedural fairness, but also the substantive fairness of a consent decree, 
including an independent review carefully examining the public interest.208 
The Second Circuit’s ruling, holding that a district court abused its discretion 
in declining to approve an SEC consent decree, focused on the district court’s 
findings that the “truth” of certain allegations was not established.209 The Sec-
ond Circuit did emphasize that the court must find a “factual basis” for such a 
decree, a requirement that mirrors the requirement of a factual basis for a plea 
agreement.210 The Second Circuit also noted: “[s]crutinizing a proposed con-
sent decree for ‘adequacy’ appears borrowed from the review applied to class 
action settlements, and strikes us as particularly inapt in the context of a pro-
posed S.E.C. consent decree.”211 The Second Circuit added: 
[b]y the same token, a consent decree does not pose the same con-
cerns regarding adequacy—if there are potential plaintiffs with a 
private right of action, those plaintiffs are free to bring their own ac-
tions. If there is no private right of action, then the S.E.C. is the enti-
                                                                                                                           
 202 SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1181 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 203 Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529. 
 204 United States v. Trucking Emp’rs, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting United 
States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975)) (emphasis added). 
 205 United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 206 City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 207 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup II), 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 208 See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Dep’t of Commerce, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1017–19 
(D. Haw. 2011) (describing procedural and substantive review, and then explaining how “the parties 
seek to incorporate their settlement into a court order, and because public interests are at stake, the 
[c]ourt must make an independent and searching inquiry, carefully scrutinizing the proposed consent 
decree”). 
 209 Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 295. 
 210 Id. at 296. 
 211 Id. at 294.  
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ty charged with representing the victims, and is politically liable if it 
fails to adequately perform its duties.212 
That ruling limits judicial review, but it does recognize that some judicial re-
view can and should be conducted. 
Importantly, the Second Circuit emphasized the continued importance of 
the public interest.213 The ruling stated that “the proper standard” asks that the 
judge “determine whether the proposed consent decree is fair and reasona-
ble” and whether it safeguards the public interest.214 The Second Circuit ex-
plained in Citigroup II: “if the S.E.C. prefers to call upon the power of the 
courts in ordering a consent decree and issuing an injunction, then the S.E.C. 
must be willing to assure the court that the settlement proposed is fair and rea-
sonable.”215 Although second-guessing the factual basis for the agreement was 
not permitted, and the Second Circuit focused on the procedural propriety of 
the resulting agreement, Citigroup II is not as narrow as sometimes sup-
posed.216 The Second Circuit still emphasized that public interest review is still 
to be done, including by focusing on the content of the agreement and whether 
it is “fair and reasonable.”217 After all, when consent decrees are reviewed, the 
public interest must be assessed as part of a court approving ongoing equitable 
remedies.218 The Second Circuit continually emphasized traditional principles 
of equity, and on remand asked that the district judge “consider whether the 
public interest would be disserved” by entry of the proposed decree.219 Alt-
hough the Second Circuit’s focus on procedural regulatory was narrow, the 
public interest role was still set out, and importantly, it is an outlier decision. A 
range of other federal courts all consistently emphasize the role of a reviewing 
judge in examining the public interest, including by inquiring into the underly-
ing facts and agency rationales.220 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Id.  
 213 Id.  
 214 Id.  
 215 Id. at 297. 
 216 See id. at 294.  
 217 Id. at 297. 
 218 For a ruling in an FTC consent decree, initially not approving the settlement due to public 
interest concerns with the lack of an admission of liability, see FTC v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-
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REV. 1288, 1294 (2015). 
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a. Tunney Act Settlements 
By statute, Congress may require that the public interest be considered 
before a judge may approve a settlement.221 Antitrust settlements are an exam-
ple. The Tunney Act, a provision of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 
states that a federal judge may enter a proposed antitrust consent decree only if 
“in the public interest.”222 The public then has a right to comment on the pro-
posed settlement. The Tunney Act requires that the judge determine whether a 
consent decree would not only promote “competition in the relevant market or 
markets,” but also its impact “upon the public generally.”223 The statute notes 
that a judge, in order to make an informed “public interest determination,” may 
hold a hearing with testimony from “Government officials or experts,” or “ap-
point a special master” or outside experts to provide analysis or evaluations, 
and permit appearances by “interested persons or agencies,” among the possi-
bilities outlined. 224 The Act was enacted in response to concerns that judges 
were rubber-stamping agreements, negotiated in secret, with no opportunity for 
third parties to participate.225 
These procedures provide an important roadmap for legislation designed to 
improve the consideration of the public interest in enforcement settlements. The 
courts, however, have not adequately given meaning to the Tunney Act provi-
sions.226 The D.C. Circuit has by its own admission, “narrowly” interpreted the 
Tunney Act’s provisions.227 In the antitrust litigation of United States v. Mi-
crosoft Corporation, the district court rejected a civil consent decree proposed by 
the DOJ.228 There was much commentary on Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin’s 
ruling; some accused him of “trying to make himself into the czar of the com-
                                                                                                                           
 221 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).  
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. § 16(e)(1)(B). 
 224 Id. § 16(f). 
 225 See generally ITT Dividend, supra note 171, at 603–06 (describing the cases the prompted 
enactment of the Tunney Act). 
 226 See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
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 227 Id.  
 228 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Microsoft, the DOJ 
filed a complaint charging Microsoft with “unlawfully maintaining a monopoly of operating systems 
. . . and unreasonably restraining trade of the same through certain anticompetitive marketing practic-
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as he did not find it was in the public interest, and in doing so reviewed many underlying facts of the 
complaint. Id. at 1454–55.  
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puter industry,”229 while others applauded him for exposing “an unenforceable 
deal that let the government save face while letting Microsoft off the hook.”230 
The D.C. Circuit reversed, and took the unusual step of reassigning the 
case to another judge, stating that the “public interest” standard did not “em-
power[ ]” the judge to reject a consent decree “merely because he believed 
other remedies were preferable.”231 In one respect, the ruling was similar to 
that in Citigroup II, where the real focus was on considering matters extrinsic 
to the agreement.232 The D.C. Circuit held that the “court was barred from 
reaching beyond the complaint to examine practices the government did not 
challenge.”233 The D.C. Circuit went even further in holding that a judge may 
only reject an agreement “that, on its face and even after government explana-
tion, appears to make a mockery of judicial power,” or if any of the terms ap-
pear ambiguous, if the enforcement mechanism is inadequate, and finally, if 
third parties will be positively injured.234 That interpretation, while permitting 
review in several circumstances, remains highly constrained—it sought to re-
write the Tunney Act, somehow making the standard for review under a statute 
that specifically states that the public interest must be examined in a narrower 
fashion than under consent decree approval rules more generally.235 Although 
the D.C. Circuit was right to conclude “the Tunney Act cannot be interpreted 
as an authorization for a district judge to assume the role of Attorney General,” 
the court should have given the public interest far more scope, in line with 
what Congress intended and in line with standard rules regarding approval of 
consent decrees.236 The court could have interpreted the public interest stand-
ard set out in the statute, rather than replacing it with its own language limiting 
the reversal authority of a judge to the situations set out. To be sure, only the 
third “mockery of judicial power” situation is a highly constrained one; the 
“inadequate” enforcement mechanism and the other situations identified do 
leave room to provide for the public interest.237 An overreaching decision by a 
district judge, in a high profile case, led to an overly constrictive appellate in-
                                                                                                                           
 229 Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need for a 
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terpretation of the entire public interest standard in the Tunney Act.238 The re-
sult may have been continued over-use of consent decrees, and the concern 
that the government seeks to regulate through the use of detailed terms in 
agreements, without meaningful judicial review.239 That said, other courts have 
adopted a different approach; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, 
permits broader judicial review under the Tunney Act.240 
The Tunney Act, intended to introduce broader public interest considera-
tions in approval of antitrust consent decrees, seemingly uncontroversially 
permits a range of procedural steps prior to their entry, including hearings with 
participation by the public and agencies and monitoring.241 Also troubling on 
the procedural side, however, is that some courts have narrowly interpreted the 
ability of private parties to intervene to represent the public interest in Tunney 
Act proceedings, stating that they may do so only after making “some strong 
showing that the government is not vigorously and faithfully representing the 
public interest.”242 
What was the rationale for narrowly interpreting a statute, which adopted 
clear language intended to provide greater judicial review of antitrust settle-
ments?243 The D.C. Circuit later explained that this was due in “part because of 
the constitutional questions that would be raised if courts were to subject the 
government’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion to non-deferential re-
view.”244 This sounds like a criminal analogy: does the same prosecutorial dis-
cretion apply in a civil enforcement case entered to accomplish regulatory ob-
jectives? And why does the Constitution permit only “deferential review” of 
negotiated settlements between the government and corporations? After all, in 
                                                                                                                           
 238 See Anderson: Antitrust Consent Decrees, supra note 229, at 6 (“[W]hile Judge Sporkin clear-
ly exceeded the proper scope of judicial review, the court of appeals has formulated an excessively 
narrow standard of judicial review.”); id. at 34 (“[I]n its haste and zeal to reverse Judge Sporkin, the 
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2003). 
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any case involving a preliminary injunction or consent decree, as noted, the 
public interest is a factor that judges must consider. Surely, such consideration 
of the public interest does not implicate a constitutional question. Nor did the 
D.C. Circuit cite to any body of law or source for its narrower interpretation of 
the statutory language. It is not as if the public interest is something constitu-
tionally committed to the Executive Branch. Moreover, Congress can and has 
regulated judicial review of a range of criminal and civil settlements. And the 
Supreme Court has, if anything, empowered district judges to modify consent 
decrees in light of changed circumstances, a different setting than the initial 
approval of a decree, but one which similarly highlights the equitable power of 
a judge.245 
A compromise approach adopted shortly after the Tunney Act’s enactment 
by a federal district court permitted constrained public interest review:  
It is not the court’s duty to determine whether this is the best possi-
ble settlement that could have been obtained if, say, the government 
had bargained a little harder. The court is not settling the case. It is 
determining whether the settlement achieved is within the reaches of 
the public interest.246 
The government may have “primacy” over charging and enforcement matters, 
but if it seeks judicial review and approval of a settlement, there is no constitu-
tional reason why the courts should not assure that the settlement comports 
with the public interest. That is particularly the case where agencies decide to 
avoid adjudication of civil enforcement actions by settling them with consent 
decrees, which, for example, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade 
Commission increasingly do.247 Nor did the public interest standard, as applied 
by the federal courts, raise any problems in its workability prior to the D.C. 
Circuit’s Microsoft opinion.248 
In response to the D.C. Circuit’s Microsoft opinion, Congress amended 
the Tunney Act in 2004, to emphasize that a courts review of antitrust consent 
decrees should not be overly narrow and courts “shall” (rather than “may” in 
the prior version) consider factors in their review.249 The Congressional find-
ings emphasized that the D.C. Circuit’s “mockery of the judicial function” 
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standard was far too narrow a view of the discretion of district judges.250 This 
change by Congress indicates that Congress is concerned about the overall 
ability of parties to enter into such agreements, using the judiciary as little 
more than a rubber stamp on the conditions that they set, with little to no op-
portunity for review to consider the public interest.  
b. Public Participation in Consent Decrees 
Where the fairness and reasonableness of a consent decree may require 
input by non-parties, public participation and defined procedures are required 
for approval of a range of civil agreements that raise issues of public im-
portance, and not just in the antitrust context. For settlements of enforcement 
actions by agencies, several federal agencies must permit notice and comment 
from the public before they enter into consent decrees regarding certain federal 
statutes.251 Further, in civil actions filed by agencies, third parties potentially 
affected by a consent decree may participate in a fairness hearing before court 
approval.252 Courts have been more open to requirements of public or third-
party participation, as opposed to substantive review of the agreements. For 
example, in 2003 in Swift v. United States, the D.C. Circuit interpreted a provi-
sion of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) providing a qui tam relator’s right to a 
hearing (set out in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)), as permitting the hearing, but 
not judicial review of a decision by the government to dismiss an FCA case.253 
And yet, courts have not been wholly consistent in their focus on proce-
dure over substance. Compare the approach towards judicial review of civil 
rights settlements, which have received quite intrusive judicial review under 
demanding standards that focus on the substance of settlement terms.254 If the 
D.C. Circuit was right that it raised a constitutional question to apply the Tun-
ney Act to consider the public interest in an antitrust settlement, then there 
should be a far greater constitutional concern with statutes such as the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, which states that injunctive relief in prison suits should 
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be “narrowly drawn” and the “least intrusive” remedy for the violation of fed-
eral rights in question.255 
Some of those suits involving consent decrees are brought by government 
enforcers while others are brought by private litigants. Private consent decrees, 
like public consent decrees, involve elements of contract, in that parties have 
agreed to settle a case. But they also invoke the ongoing equitable powers of 
the court, and similarly require judicial review and approval. Moreover, be-
cause private consent decrees require ongoing compliance, they typically re-
quire ongoing reporting to the parties and to the court, or through a monitor or 
a special master.256 The court will resolve disputes that arise under the consent 
decree by interpreting its terms and issuing injunctions to achieve compli-
ance.257 
When legislation requires that the substantive terms of private settlements 
be subject to judicial review, courts take that legislation seriously and conduct 
the required review. Under the FRCP, a class action settlement must be found 
“fair, reasonable and adequate” before it is given final approval.258 In that con-
text, the rule reflects due process concerns with the effects of a settlement on 
non-participating class members, including the need to avoid potential intra-
class conflicts, preferential treatment of certain class members over others, or 
inadequate representation. Courts have elaborated on further considerations 
regarding the complexity of the case, such as the participation of government 
litigants and the reaction of class members.259 The fairness concerns in the 
context of a criminal prosecution are different because adequacy of representa-
tion is not applicable, though an analogous concern—the interests of victims—
may be implicated. A court must also approve shareholder derivative suit set-
tlements under standards that require careful judicial review. 260 Courts have 
not shied away from carefully scrutinizing such settlements prior to approval. 
Moreover, some settlements involve parallel negotiation and settlement of 
multiple types of these agreements, including actions by civil, criminal, and 
private litigants. Not all of these agreements overlap in their requirements for 
public participation.  
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II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS 
A. Equity and the Public Interest 
Corporate settlements involve elements of contract and the law of equita-
ble judgments. There is a tension reflected in the cases discussed in the last 
Part between the desire to allow parties to settle their cases through a contract 
with negotiated terms, the power of an enforcer to decide whether and how to 
pursue adjudication,261 and the equitable power of a court over a judgment that 
it is being called on to potentially enforce and interpret going forward.262 The 
concern for the public interest can be lost in settlements between enforcing 
entities and corporations if not directly preserved in judicial review. 
What is the scope of the countervailing judicial review power? As the Su-
preme Court has put it: “the essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power . . . 
to do equity, particularly when an important public interest is involved.”263 Re-
latedly, the longstanding and traditional standards for injunctive relief include 
four factors. As the Supreme Court summarized the standard in its ruling in 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange in 2006: 
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor 
test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demon-
strate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to com-
pensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warrant-
ed; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a per-
manent injunction.264 
The public interest is a longstanding element in a federal judge’s review of 
injunctive relief as well as consent decrees.265 Parties cannot simply contract 
into injunctive relief; the judge still examines the public interest.266 To be sure, 
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some agreements do not implicate the rights of third parties or the public. But 
if the public is implicated, then the courts have a “heightened responsibil-
ity,”267 and a “larger role,” to be “satisfied of the fairness of the settlement.”268 
The equitable power protects both sides of a dispute and the public inter-
est may also counsel modification of a settlement. Judges must ensure that an 
agreement is terminated when its goals have been accomplished, and, if the 
agreement’s public interest goal still remains unfulfilled, judges must also en-
sure the agreement be made more rigorous to accomplish those goals. Thus, 
the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he federal court must exercise its 
equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been at-
tained,” the consent decree is ended, while if the State, in a decree involving a 
government actor, “establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should 
make the necessary changes; where it has not done so, however, the decree 
should be enforced according to its terms.”269 
As described in the last Part, in troubling cases in different contexts—
ranging from SEC settlements to the Tunney Act, and to DPAs—courts have 
stepped away from public interest review to narrow the authority of district 
judges.270 Nevertheless, those courts, I have argued, misinterpreted governing 
legal standards narrowed the ability of a trial judge to assess the public interest 
before entering a decree or approving a settlement.271 What would a more pub-
lic interest-oriented approach look like? 
First, judges should permit public participation where appropriate, and 
certainly when required, as in criminal matters (both regarding plea agree-
ments and DPAs as required by federal statutes), and when consent decrees call 
for it. The information provided by the public, or interest groups, or victims, 
can inform substantive review of the corporate agreement. As one scholar has 
put it: “In all cases, the courts must understand the prospective decree well 
enough to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility for compliance.”272 
Second, the public interest should be routinely considered, but informed 
by a range of factors. The Supreme Court has stated: “[e]quity eschews me-
chanical rules; it depends on flexibility.”273 That said, factors can inform this 
flexible analysis. Across a range of legal and regulatory contexts, common 
problems are emerging when constructing and reviewing complex corporate 
settlements. I have proposed a set of functional factors that can usefully break 
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out separate considerations when reviewing such settlements, each of which 
broadly relates to the public interest in obtaining a settlement that furthers un-
derlying legal or regulatory enforcement goals. These factors expand on those 
discussed by Judge Sullivan in his ruling in United States v. Saena Tech 
Corp.274 They set out practical problems and mechanisms that corporate set-
tlements typically use. Each of these factors is explored in depth in the sections 
that follow; they are not an exclusive list, however, and additional factors may 
impact the public interest. 
Third, the court should carefully consider agency explanations and evi-
dence, concerning the agency’s policy and the individual reasons for settling a 
case in a particular manner. Each of those reasons should receive careful defer-
ence, since the agency has regulatory expertise, although the judge still must 
have sufficient information to assess the claims of the enforcing agency. 
B. Public Interest Factors 
1. Adequacy of Financial Penalties 
Agreements that do not impose any fines or other penalties, or that im-
pose fines and penalties that do not comport with the purposes of the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines or statutory fines provisions, may deserve partic-
ular scrutiny. Most DPAs do not include a Sentencing Guidelines calculation or 
other explanation of the origin of any fine amount or other penalty.275 Many 
such criminal agreements provide for no criminal fine at all, sometimes with-
out explanation.276 Sometimes the company is understandably given credit for 
payments to regulators or other prosecutors.277 In some cases, the company 
may be defunct or unable to pay. Without explanation, however, it is difficult 
to evaluate whether the amounts of penalties are reasonable or fair. The same 
concerns can arise in the context of forfeiture, restitution, and other types of 
payments made in corporate settlement agreements of various types. 
Judges may sometimes consider the amount of the fine in their decision to 
approve a settlement, but it may not be enough alone to uphold the court’s re-
jection of an agreement. In 2010 in SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Federal 
Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York approved a settlement 
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after raising concerns regarding the size of the fine, noting that a $150 million 
fine was “paltry” in the context of a multi-billion dollar merger, and where its 
cost would be borne by shareholders and not responsible actors.278 The judge 
approved the settlement, but found that these flaws raised public interest con-
cerns.279 In Citigroup I, however, the judge rejected the agreement, focusing on 
the failure to require the bank to admit liability, but also noting that the fine 
was “pocket change” for a bank so large, and it was far smaller than a fine in a 
similar case involving Goldman Sachs during the same time period.280 When 
the Second Circuit reversed, the panel did not address the concerns raised in 
the district court regarding the small size of the fine.281 Although judges have 
noted the adequacy of a fine, this alone may not be enough to justify a judge’s 
rejection of an agreement and uphold that judge’s decision on appeal.  
2. Compliance 
Agreements that do not impose compliance terms or supervision of com-
pliance may raise accountability concerns. As discussed, judges have rejected 
plea agreements with corporations that do not impose supervised probation in 
order to ensure compliance.282 Also of concern are agreements that do require 
that a company make changes to its policies and compliance program without 
clearly explaining what changes are required. If the sought after good conduct 
is not spelled out in the DPA, it is unclear how the government will determine 
whether the company has demonstrated its good conduct. When judges are 
tasked with overseeing corporate agreements that call for ongoing supervision 
of compliance, judges understandably should insist that the public interest re-
quires ongoing information about compliance and probation, monitoring, or 
other mechanisms to ensure that compliance is adequately assessed. Indeed, 
many agreements do not require that compliance be regularly audited or as-
sessed, which the Sentencing Guidelines view as crucial, along with internal 
whistleblowing or reporting systems.283 The Sentencing Guidelines describe in 
some detail what minimally effective compliance may require, and taking into 
account the size of the organization.284 Accomplishing improvements to com-
pliance is an important goal of corporate prosecution, but only if that compli-
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ance is not “cosmetic,” and is carefully-assessed and audited to ensure its ef-
fectiveness. Cases that involve foreign companies can also potentially raise 
questions regarding the intersection of compliance with U.S. laws and regula-
tions and foreign corporate governance rules. Some DPAs have even called for 
the appointment of foreign corporate monitors to help assure that governance 
changes are suitable to the United States as well as the foreign country’s laws, 
regulations, and business norms.285 These monitors further keep corporations 
accountable to continue to comply with the conditions of the agreement.  
3. Monitoring 
The role of an independent monitor has become regarded as a powerful tool 
to ensure compliance and promote the public interest in corporate settlements 
because it holds corporations accountable for longer periods of time. For exam-
ple, the Antitrust Division has emphasized importance of “effective compliance 
programs,” and that the Division will “reserve the right to insist on probation, 
including the use of monitors, if doing so is necessary to ensure an effective 
compliance program and to prevent recidivism.”286 The stated goal is for the 
corporation to benefit from “expertise in the area of corporate compliance from 
an independent third party.”287 The SEC has more often appointed monitors in 
securities fraud actions and more recently, in FCPA actions.288 In a wide range of 
areas, the DOJ has led the way in establishing independent monitoring to reform 
institutions, and it typically has insisted that the reports of such monitors be 
made public.289 For years, the quarterly reports of the independent monitor of the 
Los Angeles Police Department have been made public, for example.290 It is 
standard for reports of policing monitorships established through DOJ consent 
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decrees to be made public.291 Many of these reports contain extremely detailed 
findings concerning compliance by the police departments subject to the de-
crees.292 These findings can further ensure that the parties to the agreement re-
main accountable to their promises, as well as assist judges in ascertaining 
whether or not a consent decree is contrary to the public interest.  
In criminal cases, a similar role can be observed in court ordered proba-
tion where, pursuant to special conditions, federal courts have long appointed 
special masters or corporate monitors.293 Over two-thirds of convicted corpora-
tions are put on probation.294 According to Sentencing Guidelines, corporations 
shall be put on probation if they lack an effective compliance program and 
have more than fifty employees or were otherwise required to have such a 
compliance program.295 In addition, such probation can be more actively moni-
tored if “special conditions” are imposed to ensure “changes are made within 
the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.”296 Corpo-
rate probation is court-supervised and a judge can make information about the 
process public and available on the docket. 
Yet, the use of monitors is highly uneven, particularly in criminal prose-
cutions, where monitors are typically not appointed and when they are, their 
work has remained almost entirely non-public.297 Only one-quarter of deferred 
and non-prosecution agreements since 2001 call for the appointment of a cor-
porate or independent monitor to supervise compliance, which can provide 
outside assurance that compliance has been improved.298 Absent judicial ap-
proval, there may be concerns with the selection process for the monitor posi-
tion and the monitor’s neutrality. Concerns have also been raised about the 
terms of retention of monitors, including their pay. Some agreements require 
creation of an internal Chief Compliance Officer or other similar position to 
ensure the compliance function is strengthened within the company. There is a 
growing field of scholarship critically examining the widespread role of these 
monitors in criminal prosecutions.299 Periodic reporting to a court may provide 
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further assurance that compliance is being effectively improved. Some have 
recommended that monitors could be selected in a fairer or more impartial 
manner; they have asked whether monitors effectively supervise and improve 
compliance; and whether their role is adequately defined. Scholars have asked 
why monitors are often not appointed in DPAs, if prosecutors are concerned 
that compliance programs be effective.300 
Each of these concerns could be addressed through a more robust consid-
eration of the public interest, beginning with the role of federal judges in su-
pervising the approval and implementation of corporate settlements. Equitable 
standards can inform whether monitors are to be appointed and the scope of 
their duties.301 Judges should also ask whether they should approve an agree-
ment that does not call for compliance to be independently monitored. Judge 
Gleeson cited to his “supervisory power” when calling for the monitor to re-
port to the court.302 Here, however, Judge Gleeson could have more broadly 
relied on equitable authority; then again, given the tenor of the Second Cir-
cuit’s reversal on appeal, and its ruling in the Citicorp case, one wonders 
whether the panel would have been amenable to arguments more firmly 
grounded in the public interest. Judges already exercise such authority in a 
range of settings, however, when they assess the public interest in civil consent 
decree approvals, or decide whether to impose special conditions of corporate 
probation. But they have tended not to do so in other settings, such as with 
DPAs. Regulators, or some independent third party monitor, should thus assess 
or monitor corporate compliance in order to assure that injunctive conditions 
of a settlement are effectively satisfied and in accord with the public interest. 
Moreover, the reports of monitors should be made public, so affected par-
ties have enough information to know whether to intervene if compliance is 
lacking. Special master reports in consent decrees can be quite detailed and 
they are typically made public. In some cases, reports and hearings involving 
testimony of a special master discussing compliance of a company on corpo-
rate probation are part of the federal docket.303 Some corporations have them-
selves made public the reports of independent monitors during probation.304 
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(D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2009) (No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA)). Special Master’s Fifth Report, United States v. 
Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 2009 WL 3074727 (D. Ct. Conn. Jan. 12, 2011) (No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA)). 
 304 See Environmental Compliance Plans, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.duke-energy.com/our-
company/environment/compliance-and-reporting/environmental-compliance-plans [https://perma.cc/
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The outlier situation is in cases settled out of court, particularly criminal DPAs, 
in which monitors reports have almost never been made public.305 In these in-
stances, affected parties may not be able to seek intervention if the corporation 
is not compliant.  
The entire concept of a corporate monitor is to retain a person or entity 
that is independent: not an agent of the corporation or of the prosecutor, but 
rather an entity serving in the public interest. This independent party provides 
information to the parties as well as the judge, and in my view, it should also 
inform the public. The reports by that monitor, properly redacted, should in-
form the judge’s supervision of a case, whether it is a civil or criminal judg-
ment or settlement. Among the public, other corporations can benefit from best 
practices and success stories described in monitor reports, as well as from the 
difficulties monitors encounter. Thus, despite the Second Circuit ruling in 
HSBC IV, I hope the practice changes and that prosecutors and corporations 
make it a policy to routinely make portions of these monitors reports public. 
Such lessons may ultimately help prevent corporate violations in the first in-
stance, which, in my view, serves perhaps the largest public interest of all. 
4. Cooperation with Law Enforcement 
Settlement agreements with corporations can include agreements of the 
corporation to cooperate with law enforcement after investigations have con-
cluded. These also take into account a corporation’s cooperation before a set-
tlement was reached. One common feature of corporate settlements is agree-
ment by the company to cooperate in any pending investigations of miscon-
duct. Some settlements might not involve the need for any such further coop-
eration. Any investigations of individuals, such as criminal investigations, may 
have been declined or completed. If further investigations are anticipated, 
however, it is highly problematic from a public interest perspective if agree-
ments do not require cooperation, or where a company that did not fully coop-
erate at times prior to settlement still receives leniency. This is problematic 
because it does not incentivize cooperation by the corporations prior to the set-
tlement stage and hinders the outcome of investigations, and, thus, the ability 
of the investigatory agency to build its case.  
Self-reporting by a company deserves particular credit, where the conduct 
might not otherwise have come to the attention of law enforcement.306 Initial 
non-cooperation, in contrast, may not warrant the same treatment. An agree-
ment that provides some sort of release from prosecution of responsible indi-
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viduals who might otherwise have been prosecuted may raise concerns. Alt-
hough courts have, in rare cases, with examples noted, rejected organizational 
plea agreements expressing concern with the non-prosecution of individuals, 
the authority to consider non-cooperation regarding other prosecutions as a 
factor is less than entirely clear. Agreements commonly provide for the full 
cooperation of the company with all pending investigations by regulators and 
prosecutors. Terms requiring waiver of work product or attorney client privi-
lege have raised judicial concerns in past cases.307  
5. Substantive Law and Unrelated Terms 
The public interest in a corporate settlement is fundamentally defined by 
the underlying sources of substantive law that give rise to the offense. Settle-
ments should not be entered that contradict the goals of those sources of sub-
stantive law. For example, I have suggested that imposing substantial, unrelat-
ed obligations on an organization, which are not called for by governing stat-
utes or sentencing guidelines, would call for judicial review. In the context of 
criminal DPAs, terms such as those requiring a charitable contribution unrelat-
ed to remedying the harm caused by the crime, might also deserve judicial in-
tervention. Those terms are now contrary to the DOJ’s own guidelines and, so, 
a party would be unlikely to include them in a criminal prosecution agree-
ment.308 If obligations wholly unrelated to the agreement are included, judicial 
intervention should block them. Such judicial review does not contravene sep-
aration of powers, but rather aims to prevent enforcers from themselves step-
ping outside the bounds defined by substantive law. 
6. Collateral Consequences 
In corporate prosecutions and settlements, there are often unintended con-
sequences that accompany the intended penalty to the corporation. For some 
companies, and in some regulated industries, a conviction could result in sus-
pension or debarment that would have unduly severe consequences for a com-
pany.309 If a company was debarred from doing work critical to its business, 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See Garrett: Corporate Confessions, supra note 51 (discussing controversy and policy changes 
concerning both types of privilege).  
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employees and shareholders who did not participate in the wrongdoing could 
be seriously harmed. The public might be harmed if the company provides an 
important product or service to the public or to the government. Fairness may 
sometimes counsel a settlement that avoids such collateral consequences, and 
such consequences are understandably a factor that prosecutors take great care 
to consider. Sometimes suspension or debarment from government contracting 
might be a consequence of a violation or a conviction. In addition, a deferred 
prosecution, although not a judgment, may itself result in legal and collateral 
consequences, providing still additional reasons for a judge to supervise and 
approve the agreement.310 
That said, collateral consequences can often be avoided through negotia-
tions with regulators. Further, concerns that public companies would be de-
stroyed by an indictment, much less a conviction, have turned out to be highly 
overstated. Many public companies have been convicted in recent years with-
out such consequences.311 Thus, judges should carefully assess any claims that 
potential collateral consequences demand more lenient treatment. 
A different use of equitable power by the judge to avoid undue collateral 
consequences can involve the use of a stay of civil proceedings, pending reso-
lution of criminal proceedings. Parallel proceedings are common and encour-
aged by government policy,312 and they are permitted where enforcers have 
overlapping authority.313 Equitable remedies, however, can ensure that discov-
ery from a criminal case can be used in a civil case, but also that criminal pro-
cedure protections are not eroded through use of evidence in a civil case, 
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where the same protections and standards of proof do not apply.314 Doing so 
can also reduce the burden on the judicial system of managing parallel litiga-
tion regarding the same corporate conduct. 
7. The Public and Victims 
 When a settlement impacts third parties, there is much broader agreement 
among the legal community that a judge should more carefully review its 
terms.315 Process values matter in such circumstances, and not just the proce-
dural fairness to the defendant, but procedural fairness to members of the pub-
lic, victims, or third parties who may have an opportunity to intervene and par-
ticipate. Judges should be attentive to the procedural and substantive rights of 
the public in such settlements, and in some areas of law, those rights can be 
fairly robust. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines prioritizes payment 
of restitution to victims over fines paid to the government.316 Some DPAs pro-
vide for restitution to victims, but there is the concern that victims do not par-
ticipate as they would in a plea proceeding, and cannot raise questions relevant 
to their interests as well as the public interest.317 Whether restitution would be 
appropriate or participation by victims is appropriate could be a factor to con-
sider. Recently, Congress spoke on the issue of DPAs by further buttressing the 
role of judicial supervision and approval of DPAs, in line with the concerns set 
out in this Article.318 In the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, 
Congress included a provision that victims have a statutory right to be notified 
of DPAs.319 The CVRA was amended to establish that each “crime victim” has 
“[t]he right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred 
prosecution agreement,” thus facilitating their “right to full and timely restitu-
tion as provided in law,” providing, in addition, for appellate review of any 
denial of restitution.320 Those provisions assure that when a DPA is filed in 
court, it cannot be approved without the involvement of relevant victims.321  
Those provisions highlight how approval and supervision of DPAs, or, for 
that matter, potentially any type of settlement between a corporation and the 
government, implicates judicial review, public interests, and specifically victim 
                                                                                                                           
 314 For a wonderful Note exploring these issues and recommending the use of equitable power to 
stay parallel civil proceedings, see generally Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel 
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Agency Enforcement Decrees, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 89 (2015). 
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 318 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (2012 & Supp. III 2015).  
 319 Id.  
 320 Id. § 3771(a).  
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rights.322 Similarly, provisions could be enacted in a range of civil contexts as 
well; the Tunney Act and certain other statutes contain such provisions, but it 
could be a broader principle that any settlement with a corporation, civil or 
criminal, can only be approved with notice and participation of relevant vic-
tims. These provisions protect the victims, as well as bolster the role of the 
public interest in these corporate settlements.  
8. Government Interests 
The goals of prosecutors or regulatory enforcers and the underlying sub-
stantive goals of regulatory schemes, where the crime is a provision incorpo-
rated into such a scheme, are highly relevant to evaluating the fairness and rea-
sonableness of a corporate agreement. These are considered the government’s 
interests. None of this discussion has been to suggest that judges should not 
assume that the government should and does represent the public interest. In-
stead, these factors have focused on situations in which the public interest may 
diverge. This is important because, where these interests do diverge, the judici-
ary may be the only point at which settlements are reviewed with the public 
interest in mind.  
Moreover, judicial review can help to sort out situations in which the 
government itself does not speak uniformly. A criminal prosecution may be the 
product of a referral by regulators as a particularly serious violation, but one 
that would otherwise be handled using a civil agreement with a set of compli-
ance terms developed by regulators. The reasonableness and fairness of 
agreements with regulatory subject matter may be assessed with reference to 
the goals and the enforcement outcomes in similar (or parallel) administrative 
proceedings. In addition, the views of the referring agency may also be rele-
vant on the reasonableness of the agreement as these agencies originally had 
the capacity to resolve the situation itself. 
Judges should also consider whether other parallel actions may vindicate 
some of the relevant public interests. Further, if other sovereigns are involved, 
the public interest may be attenuated. For example, if the conduct and the vic-
tims are foreign, and separate actions abroad are being pursued, judges may 
conclude that the public interest of citizens of the United States is attenuated. 
Moreover, in general, prosecutions involving foreign corporations may involve 
special issues and practical difficulties making settlements particularly desira-
ble, including difficulties in securing access to evidence overseas, challenges 
faced in extraditing individuals, jurisdictional obstacles to prosecution or the 
enforcement of judgments, questions of foreign policy, and matters raising dip-
lomatic concerns.323 Of course, there are also concerns that foreign companies 
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be held to the same legal standards as domestic companies.324 All of those con-
cerns should be considered carefully when reviewing corporate settlements. 
9. Delay 
An additional factor is the effect of the period of delay on statutes of limi-
tations or other interests. In some cases, the implementation of an agreed upon 
resolution with a corporation will take a considerable period of time. The peri-
od of delay during an agreement may itself be prejudicial to certain types of 
interests and worth examining in certain cases. Any consent decree or agree-
ment will typically require some period of time for its implementation (if it did 
not, the company would pay a fine but not be subject to any ongoing agree-
ment). During that time, statutes of limitation to pursue charges against indi-
vidual officers or employees may expire, and investigations may be ongo-
ing.325 As a result, cooperation of the company during that time may be im-
portant. In general, an organizational prosecution agreement anticipates a 
range of future conduct that itself may implicate judicial supervision. The fact 
that a judge would require certain assurances that good conduct will result 
from an agreement, before approving such an agreement to delay litigation, 
and retain authority to supervise a case on the docket, seems quite uncontro-
versial. 
10. Informing the Public 
 A distinct interest that the public shares in resolution of corporate set-
tlements is in obtaining information about conduct that affects the public. The 
statements of facts and other documents that can accompany such settlements 
may set out what the violations were to give the public an accounting. As de-
scribed, ongoing monitoring can describe the progress of change at a company, 
and I have argued that there is a public interest in being informed as to the sta-
tus of that progress. One concern in these cases has been the lack of transpar-
ency in corporate agreements, including a lack of explanation regarding how 
fines were calculated, a lack of factual accounting describing who or what was 
involved in the relevant violations, and agreements and monitor reports that 
have not been made public. In criminal prosecutions of corporations, a compa-
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ny must typically admit its responsibility and guilt and do so in detail, with a 
prohibition on contradicting those factual representations.326  
However, civil agreements may not include nearly as much information. 
One of the concerns raised concerning the past use of “neither admit nor deny” 
settlements with the SEC was that it was in the public interest to know whether 
the company did in fact engage in wrongdoing.327 Judge Rakoff had rejected 
the Citigroup I settlement, with its “neither admit nor deny” language, in part 
because “the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what the underly-
ing facts are.”328 Private settlements may be entirely confidential, but to enter 
into a settlement with the government that keeps important facts from the pub-
lic is harder to square with the purpose of public enforcement; as Judge Rakoff 
put it, the SEC itself has a duty to ensure that “the truth emerges.” 329 Similarly, 
federal prosecutors have such a duty, and just as in a case resolved by a guilty 
plea in which factual admissions are put on the record,330 and court-supervised 
probation results in monitor reports put on the record, prosecutors should insist 
that the facts are made public in cases resolved through deferred and non-
prosecution agreements.  
Admissions of wrongdoing and detailed factual statements also help to 
accomplish deterrence: they may affect the reputation of firms, and they may 
result in collateral consequences in subsequent litigation.3313 Apart from those 
features of public admissions, corporate enforcement can serve to inform the 
public as to the nature of the relevant violations.332 The public cannot be as-
sured that enforcers are actually acting in the public interest if cases are settled 
in a way that the public cannot fully see or understand. 
                                                                                                                           
 326 Although most corporate prosecution agreements include those features, for the concern that 
corporate prosecution agreements do not always include detailed statements of facts or descriptions of 
the circumstances of a company’s cooperation, see GARRETT: TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 1, at 61–
63. 
 327 SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. (Citigroup I), Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
rev’d and vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014); Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Changes Policy on Firms’ 
Admission of Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/sec-to-
change-policy-on-companies-admission-of-guilt.html [https://perma.cc/Q95Y-YFPF]. 
 328 Citigroup I, 827 F.Supp.2d at 332. 
 329 Id. at 335. 
 330 The DOJ permits a nolo contendere or Alford plea that does not include a factual admission of 
guilt only in “the most unusual circumstances” and with high-level DOJ approval. U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-16.010, .015 (Oct. 2008). An Alford plea is “when a de-
fendant maintains his or her innocence with respect to the charge to which he or she offers to plead 
guilty.” Id. § 9-16.015 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)). 
331 Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law, 
82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 506–12 (2013) [hereinafter Buell: Liability and Admissions]; Samuel W. 
Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 483, 507 (2006). 
 332 This can in turn buttress deterrence. “If the enterprise of public prosecution appears unprinci-
pled or even random, then surely deterrence is seriously weakened.” Buell: Liability and Admissions, 
supra note 331, at 514. 
2017] The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements 1537 
C. Deference 
Although the judge should consider these functional public interest fac-
tors, in context, the judge must significantly defer to agency priorities and in-
terests in settlement. There will be disagreements on what constitutes the “pub-
lic interest” in certain cases. Therefore, it is important for judges to be trans-
parent in their explanations of how they have weighed the factors involved. 
Moreover, when enforcement entities make initial decisions and courts review 
them, courts should give deference to those decisions.333 I have argued that this 
judicial review should not just examine the procedural regularity of settle-
ments, but also their substance. Accordingly, judges should give great defer-
ence to decisions made by enforcers. But, how much deference is due? 
The more the settlement conforms to statutory and regulatory procedures 
and substance, the more deference should be due. Thus, a plea bargain, within 
the range set out by sentencing guidelines, receives a great deal of deference 
by a judge. A DPA, in contrast, would not be due the same deference. 
In no context in which public interest is a factor is a judge permitted to 
substitute an assessment of the public interest entirely for that of the agency. 
Agencies must be able to decide whether to pursue adjudication, and in what 
form. Any settlement necessarily involves compromise by both sides. Moreo-
ver, agencies must be free to alter their policies or tailor them in individual 
cases. The Tunney Act approach requiring an agency to publicly state its rea-
sons for settling a case, and providing evidence to support its consent decree, 
provides a useful model. As one scholar has suggested, a court can presume the 
public interest is satisfied, absent strong evidence to the contrary, but place the 
burden on the agency to initially demonstrate that it has considered all of the 
affected interests in deciding to settle the case.334 Similarly, a judge should not 
engage in “rubber stamp approval” of an independent evaluator or monitor, but 
should make a separate and independent assessment.335 This balance between 
deference to the agency decision along with an outspoken judicial concern for 
the public interest overall helps ensure that corporate settlements are not con-
trary to the public interest.  
III. IMPROVING THE LAW AND EQUITY OF CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS 
In this Part, I turn to proposals to improve the review of corporate settle-
ments, not just through judicial review, but also through internal regulatory 
measures.  
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First, Congress can intervene, as it has in the past, to enact legislation to 
provide clearer avenues for the public interest to be considered in corporate 
settlements. 
Second, prosecutors can implement internal procedural changes to better 
account for the public interest and participation by the public. The DOJ has 
pushed for more consistency in its process of investigating and charging corpo-
rations, both civilly and criminally. These internal procedural changes, howev-
er, lack any acknowledgement of role for the public interest in these prosecu-
tions. Guidelines internal to the DOJ have been adopted but without notice and 
comment or participation by the public. High profile settlements are still en-
tered without meaningful participation of victims or public interest groups. 
Third, judicial review under equitable principles can further safeguard the 
public interest, if judges assert their role more forcefully. I argue that no matter 
what the mechanism, the key feature of equitable review should remain central 
to efforts to improve corporate settlements: a careful consideration of the pub-
lic interest. As described, that judicial review should be more deferential to the 
extent a settlement tracks statutory and regulatory procedures and substance. 
Less formal settlements negotiated farther outside established procedures and 
substance deserve, and should receive, less judicial deference. In this way, the 
public interest in corporate settlements can be more protected in a more estab-
lished way while still allowing the settlements outside of statutory procedures 
to withstand judicial review.  
A. Legislation 
Legislation can provide greater or fewer tools to judges when they review 
settlements. The Supreme Court has held that the equitable powers of federal 
judges are not viewed as restricted by Congress absent a clear statement, a 
“clear and valid legislative command.”336 Courts have followed legislation that 
has narrowed judicial review of complex agreements, chiefly in the institution-
al reform setting in civil rights cases, but also regarding corporate settlements 
of class actions, without raising any constitutional concerns. Nevertheless, 
courts have narrow authority to review corporate settlements, despite legisla-
tion calling for public interest review.337 For example, Congress not only had 
to enact the Tunney Act to ensure careful judicial review of the public interest 
in antitrust consent decrees, but then amended the Act in 2004 to highlight the 
mandatory nature of judicial review.338 Congress intervened to ensure that vic-
tim interests are considered when DPAs are entered. 
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It is a larger question whether equitable authority to review settlements is 
part of the Article III authority of federal judges, and whether the only way to in 
fact reduce such power is to deny jurisdiction over a type of case. Regardless, 
when legislation does provide for public interest review, judges should carefully 
carry out those duties. Congress may increasingly intervene if appellate courts 
continue to limit the public interest power of federal judges. Recent legislation 
designed to accomplish this goal has been proposed, such as the bipartisan 
“Transparency in Settlements” legislation passed by the U.S. Senate but not the 
House of Representatives,339 and no doubt Congress will consider further legis-
lation in the future. When the United Kingdom adopted DPAs, lawmakers set out 
in an act, the considerations judges should take into account when deciding 
whether to approve them, as well as the process to be followed.340 Such a statute 
could be enacted in the United States as well. Legislation enacted by courts that 
further clarifies Congressional concern for the public interest will cause courts to 
take up concern for the public interest more frequently.  
B. Internal Guidelines 
Second, many have observed how internal administrative mechanisms 
can regulate enforcement. One solution is for units within agencies to consider 
enforcement priorities and solicit input from the public. One scholar has ar-
gued that in the criminal prosecution agreement context, judges may lack “the 
expertise or the incentives to intervene to provide genuine oversight,” and be-
cause prosecutors have a “tremendous degree of discretion,” it falls to prosecu-
tors to create more specific guidelines to govern such settlements.341 Indeed, a 
proliferating approach among agencies is to issue guidelines for enforce-
ment.342 There are even guidelines emphasizing the importance of issuing 
more guidelines. Thus, the DOJ has emphasized in recent years that: “Every 
United States Attorney’s Office and Department litigating component should 
have policies and procedures for early and appropriate coordination of the 
government’s criminal, civil, regulatory, and administrative remedies.”343 
These guidelines, however, have tended not to discuss issues specific to en-
forcement against corporations and the equitable decisions that must be made 
when designing such matters. Therefore, it is increasingly important for these 
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agencies to review their internal procedures related to enforcement against 
corporations.  
Another approach is to create specialized oversight within enforcement 
agencies to coordinate enforcement and adopt uniform approaches towards 
remedies. One professor has described such “offices of goodness,” including 
offices designed to ensure protection of civil rights and civil liberties.344 There 
may also be pressure from other agencies placed upon enforcement agencies, 
when there is a disconnect between their approaches.345 Many agencies have 
adopted cooperation agreements, formal and informal, to coordinate enforce-
ment in complex corporate cases.346 
In the criminal context, charging factors are laid out in guidelines, as well 
as procedural rules for appointing monitors, among the topics addressed in de-
tail, but not the substance of the terms of those complex agreements. For cor-
porate prosecution agreements, the main DOJ Fraud Section has created a 
compliance counsel position to advise the DOJ on complex compliance is-
sues.347 And, to be sure, the DOJ is right to have “no formulaic requirements 
regarding corporate compliance programs.”348 Without adopting rigid require-
ments that do suit the variety of corporations and cases, the DOJ could insist 
that compliance be rigorously audited utilizing industry-specific best practices. 
Where many agreements lack much specificity concerning compliance or how 
it is to be implemented, the DOJ and other agencies could go much further. 
Of course, there is also a concern that centralizing review and oversight 
could harm experimentation and innovation, and make it easier for the industry 
to capture the process and promote less stringent enforcement remedies.349 In-
formal guidelines do not have the status of regulations. They can therefore be 
more easily changed from one administration to the next, offering less certain-
ty to companies. And even if there are guidelines for corporate remedies, it will 
still be important for judges to conduct review to ensure that they are adhered 
to and that the public interest is observed. Changes to internal regulations in 
administrative bodies may aid in settlements where the underlying issues relate 
to the specialized knowledge of these agencies, but the need to protect the pub-
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lic interest in these settlements does not absolve the parties from the potential 
need for judicial review.  
C. Judicial Review 
Why have courts of appeals occasionally tried to tie the hands of district 
judges? What was most troubling about the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Fokker III, 
as with its ruling two decades earlier in Microsoft, was not the result (defensi-
ble in both cases), but the reasoning emphasizing that legislation should be 
interpreted to maximize executive discretion in settling criminal cases.350 In 
contrast, the Second Circuit’s ruling in Citigroup II emphasized the need for a 
judge to stay within the boundaries of a consent decree, but it did not carefully 
preserve the role of a judge to review whether an agreement comports with the 
public interest.351 Where the D.C. Circuit’s canon of legislative construction 
came from is hard to say, but in both cases, it represents a remarkable abdica-
tion of the crucial Article III role in assuring that settlements entered in court 
satisfy the public interest as a matter of equity. The public interest was no-
where discussed in those two opinions, except in an implicit assumption that 
whatever the government decides to do necessarily represents the public inter-
est. That is where the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit panels got it wrong. The 
equitable power of Article III judges cannot be so blithely constrained. Judges, 
as described, may modify consent decrees and other settlements using equita-
ble powers, although judges are supposed to protect federal interests and defer 
to expertise of enforcement agencies.352 
Congress has wisely intervened to enact legislation protecting that role, 
including in the Tunney Act and to protect certain victim rights in such de-
ferred prosecution settlements.353 Although such legislation is desirable, and 
can define and bound judicial review of settlements, no such legislation should 
be needed. As I have argued, judicial review is most important and should be 
least deferential in areas in which there is not legislation or regulations that 
provide guidance for settlements in enforcement actions. At a minimum, Arti-
cle III equitable powers remain intact unless clearly limited by valid legisla-
tion. Fortunately, courts continue to emphasize the importance of the judicial 
review to safeguard the public interest in a range of contexts. It is unfortunate, 
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though, that the influential D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal 
have, from time to time, taken such narrow approaches towards the responsi-
bilities of district judges to review and supervise corporate settlements. 
CONCLUSION 
In approving the DPA with HSBC, Judge John Gleeson warned that a set-
tlement of a federal criminal case is “not window dressing,” and a federal 
judge is not “a potted plant.” 354 Or, as another court put it, “[a]lthough the 
court’s discretion should be exercised in favor of the strong policy favoring 
voluntary settlement of litigation, when reviewing a consent decree, a district 
court must independently scrutinize its terms and avoid “‘rubber stamp ap-
proval.’”355 Or, continuing with that theme, another court found courts may not 
“merely imprimit [the parties’] decision as though possessed of a clerical rub-
ber stamp.”356 Whether the case is civil or criminal, and regardless what form 
the settlement takes, the public interest is an inherent part of a judge’s equita-
ble power to approve and supervise an injunctive degree. Yet, that judicial role 
has been neglected and eroded in the context of some types of corporate set-
tlements, including those in which judicial review should be the least deferen-
tial. Judges have acted like potted plants and appellate courts have relegated to 
them a rubber-stamp role, even in the face of federal statutes to the contrary 
and settlements that take place outside statutory and regulatory guidelines. 
Judicial supervision must take many forms in complex agreements that 
anticipate complex and lengthy injunctive remedies. The role of the judge be-
gins with the decision whether to approve the agreement; to supervise a judg-
ment entered in a civil consent decree, a criminal plea bargain or a more in-
formal DPA; to resolve any disputes that occur during the pendency of the 
agreement; and to decide whether and when to narrow the remedies or termi-
nate an agreement as having been satisfied. Any type of corporate agreement 
filed in court that calls for injunctive remedies implicates the equitable power 
of a judge to consider the public interest. 
The public interest standard must be informed so that judges exercise 
meaningful review that protects the public interest and participation rights, as 
well as respects the discretion and judgment of government agencies. Judge 
Rakoff expressed the concern in Citigroup I that 
[t]he injunctive power of the judiciary is not a free-roving remedy to 
be invoked at the whim of a regulatory agency, even with the con-
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sent of the regulated. If its deployment does not rest on facts—cold, 
hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by trials—it 
serves no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of op-
pression.357 
Judges require both facts and guiding factors to inform their review and super-
vision through injunctive action. Fortunately, judges have developed factors to 
inform their review in several contexts, and that case law can inform consider-
ation of the public interest in corporate settlements. 
The complexity of corporate agreements and their public importance pro-
vides all the more reason to conduct a careful individualized review of their 
fairness and reasonableness before approval. Doing so may safeguard the pub-
lic interest, as with the judicial review of plea agreements and civil settle-
ments. Careful judicial review can avoid unnecessary disputes during the im-
plementation of corporate agreements with an organization. More comprehen-
sive judicial review, where the parties negotiate outside statutory and regulato-
ry bounds, can incentivize more regularized settlement practices. The multi-
billion dollar settlements that have proliferated raise substantial public interest 
concerns, from the perspectives of public interest groups, industry groups, and 
citizens. Clearer guidance on the scope and goals of remedies, and independent 
review of content and implementation would benefit all sides. After all, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized, some agreements may need to be strength-
ened to accomplish the public interest, while others may need to be narrowed 
or terminated, where “enforcement of the decree without modification would 
be detrimental to the public interest.”358 
In this Article, I have made the case that the public interest is central to 
the equitable role of federal judges when considering corporate settlements of 
all stripes. An examination of the public interest is not just within the capacity 
of federal judges, it is at the core of their responsibility when approving and 
supervising detailed corporate settlements that call for ongoing remedies. All 
corporate agreements filed in a federal court demand a rigorous, informed, and 
careful consideration of the public interest. 
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